Colombian Politics Digest II: President Petro

Gustavo Petro took office as President of Colombia on August 7. This marks the beginning of a new era in Colombian politics: the country’s first left-wing president, promising major changes to Colombia’s political and socioeconomic system.

The coming months (and years) promise to be exciting, so this humble blog will try to follow along as things go and bring you analysis of what’s going on in Colombian politics under President Gustavo Petro.

In this edition: Gustavo Petro’s inauguration, Petro’s cabinet appointments and the election of the next Comptroller General

Petro’s inauguration

President Petro receiving the presidential sash (source: Presidencia)

Gustavo Petro was sworn in as President on August 7. It was an historic inauguration, rich in symbolism and pageantry, as Petro had wanted. Colombian presidential inaugurations tended to be reserved and formal events, following a strict protocol. Since 2010, the inauguration ceremony has taken place outside, on the Plaza de Bolívar, Bogotá’s main square, with the Capitol as the backdrop. This has brought the event closer to the general public.

In the past, attendance was largely limited to politicians, famous personalities and foreign delegations including other heads of state. However, Petro wanted a massive crowd of 100,000 people to attend his inauguration in Bogotá, in addition to ‘watch parties’ elsewhere in the country. Concerts and over 50 cultural performances, with some 1,000 artists, were organized prior to the formal ceremony in the afternoon, showcasing the cultural diversity of Colombia. Petro said that he wanted his inauguration to be a ‘great popular festival’. The large and enthusiastic crowd, gathered to witness the historic inauguration of Colombia’s first left-wing president, included all sorts of people: young people, seniors, families, students, left-wing activists, cultural groups, indigenous peoples, Afro-Colombians, former members of the M-19 guerrilla…

For his own formal ceremony, Petro wanted lots of pageantry and symbolism. Alongside foreign heads of state (including King Felipe VI of Spain) he invited six ‘ordinary people’ (who had ‘featured’ in his campaign) as guests of honour — like a fisherman from Honda (Tolima), a street vendor from Quibdó (Chocó), a street sweeper from Medellín, a coffee farmer from Anserma (Caldas) and a fourth-generation silletero from Medellín.

Foreign dignitaries included the presidents of Ecuador, Chile, Argentina, Bolivia, Honduras, Paraguay, the Dominican Republic and Costa Rica as well as the first lady of Mexico, the vice presidents of Peru, El Salvador and Honduras, the foreign ministers of Cuba and Portugal and delegations from Algeria, Iran, Serbia, the UK, Japan, South Korea and the US. The US delegation was led by Samantha Power, administrator of USAID. Former presidents César Gaviria, Ernesto Samper and Juan Manuel Santos attended, but former presidents Andrés Pastrana and Álvaro Uribe did not.

The most potent (and contentious) symbol was the sword of Simon Bolívar. Besides the obvious historic symbolism of the Libertador’s sword, the sword is also important in a more recent historical context. In January 1974, the sword was stolen by the M-19 guerrilla (of which Petro was a part of) in a spectacular raid. For several years, the sword was kept in Cuba by Fidel Castro. The sword was returned it to the government in 1991 by Antonio Navarro, after the M-19’s demobilization in 1990. Since then, it has been kept safely under lock and key in underground vaults. Petro saw the sword for the first time when Duque showed it to him at their first meeting during the transition.

Petro wanted the sword to be the centerpiece of his inauguration. As La Silla Vacía revealed beforehand, the plan was for Petro and his family to walk behind the sword as they made their way to the stage. However, at the last minute, Iván Duque did not authorize its use in the ceremony, alleging security reasons. After a tense transition, it was a final snub from Duque to Petro. Right after he was sworn in, even before administering the oath of office to Vice President Francia Márquez, Petro’s first presidential order was to bring out Bolívar’s sword. A bizarre 15-minute recess was called to fetch the sword. The sword, placed in a glass urn, was brought in by a guard of honour and placed on the main stage, besides Petro as he gave his inaugural address. King Felipe VI of Spain was the only one who did not stand up, sparking some controversy in Spain (but not in Colombia).

Petro referred to the sword as he began his inaugural address. He said that getting there, next to the sword, was for him “a lifetime, an existence”. Paraphrasing its owner, he said “may she only be sheathed when there is justice in this country”. He said that he wants the sword to be the “sword of the people”, never again to be buried, and he has placed it in public view in the presidential palace (the Casa de Nariño) for visitors to see.

Besides the sword, M-19 symbolism was present everywhere on August 7. Veterans of the eme travelled to Bogotá to attend the inauguration, and there were a lot of M-19 flags in the audience.

President Petro taking the oath of office (source: Presidencia)

Since the campaign, particularly the runoff campaign, it has been obvious that Petro pays a lot of attention to imagery and symbolism. Just before his inauguration, he left political commentators in the dark (and stood up over 300 mayors at the assembly of the federation of municipalities) to travel to Caño Cristales (one of the most beautiful places in Colombia) for the photoshoot for his official presidential photograph. His official photograph, which has been mocked for being obviously Photoshopped and cheaply edited, has Caño Cristales as the backdrop. All past presidential photographs were more standard: inside the presidential palace.

Petro also unveiled a new video to accompany the national anthem (played before presidential addresses). It notably features cycling icon Nairo Quintana, the men’s and women’s national football teams and popular singer Karol G.

The oath of office to the incoming president is administered by the President of the Congress (Senate), now Roy Barreras (the chameleonic political operator).

However, in a surprise break from tradition, Petro received the presidential sash from Pacto senator María José Pizarro, the daughter of former M-19 commander Carlos Pizarro (assassinated in 1990). Pizarro was in tears as she recalled her late father. She wore a red jacket with her father’s face knitted on the back, with the message “may the struggle for peace not cost us our lives”.

Vice President Francia Márquez, the first black woman to be vice president, also broke with the past. At the end of the formal oath of office (swearing to God and to the people), she added that she also swore before her ancestors (ancestros y ancestras), “until dignity becomes customary”.

Gustavo Petro’s inaugural address was lengthy. He reiterated his main promises and priorities, but also emphasized the historic and “unprecedented” nature of his government.

Petro has often been called a left-wing populist, and he made several references to the people (pueblo) in his speech (and has styled his government, interchangeably with ‘government of change’, the ‘government of the people’). He claimed that, when he feels weak, it is the love for the people and for the people who suffer from exclusion that has kept him going, to “unite and now build a nation”. He pitted himself against los de siempre (the usual/the same as always) and those who didn’t want to let go of power.

With history in mind, Petro said that they were there “against all odds, against a history that said we were never going to govern” but that they made the impossible possible, and that they would now strive to make more impossible things possible in Colombia.

Making repeated allusions to Gabriel García Márquez’s One Hundred Years of Solitude, he said “today begins our second opportunity”.

Petro talked at length about some of his main priorities: “total peace”, social justice, reducing extreme inequalities through redistribution of wealth, a ‘productive economy’ and climate change among other topics. He said that the war on drugs has “failed resoundingly”, referring not only to the Latin American victims of the drug wars but also to the opioid epidemic and deaths from drug overdose in the United States. He recognized that the Colombian state had committed crimes. To fight climate change, he called for a global fund to save the Amazon rainforest and proposed that the IMF faciliate a ‘debt for nature swap’. He envisions the army building houses, roads and irrigation districts in the countryside, a major redefinition of the military’s role (away from counterinsurgency warfare).

In the final third of his speech, Petro listed the ‘decalogue’ of his government: ten commitments, a mix of policy statements and broader promises.

These ten commitments were: total peace; inclusion of marginalized groups leaving no one behind; real gender equality; an ‘open door government’ and dialogue with everyone; a vow to listen to all Colombians; a comprehensive ‘humane security’ policy; fighting corruption; environmental protection; industrial and agricultural development and finally a promise to abide by and enforce the constitution and the laws.

He had already made these pledges and promises during the campaign. For example, he talked about dialogues with all sides to build a ‘great national agreement’ (Gran Acuerdo Nacional) and his promise to respect the constitution and the laws during the campaign and reiterated those promises during the transition.

In his inaugural address, Petro did not mention some of his more controversial policy proposals, like his (overly?) ambitious idea for a rapid energy transition away from fossil fuels (an idea which the government has already toned down a bit) or the agrarian (rural) reform. He mentioned his immediate priority, the tax reform (now before Congress), and a future healthcare reform, pension reform, education reform and labour reform.

More surprisingly, Petro talked at length about peace, which had been a fairly marginal issue in the campaign. Since his election, however, Petro has made it one of his early priorities. In his inaugural address, he mentioned the word ‘peace’ 22 times and said that Colombia must end, once and for all, six decades of violence and conflict. He vowed to fully implement the 2016 peace agreement and ‘strictly follow’ the recommendations of the truth commission’s recent report. Petro invited all armed groups, without mentioning any by name, to lay down their weapons and accept legal benefits in exchange for peace and non-repetition. The new administration is already working to relaunch the frozen peace negotiations with the ELN guerrilla and to provide a new framework for collective ‘surrenders to justice’ (sometimiento a la justicia) for other illegal armed groups like the Clan del Golfo.

Marking a paradigm shift, ideas such as terrorism, national security and drug trafficking were not mentioned. Cognizant of many voters’ preoccupation with security and criminality, Petro said that he wishes to defend families from insecurity, all while promising a new comprehensive ‘humane security’ policy (without giving much details).

Presidential inaugurations can set the tone for the incoming administration. In 2018, the unusually belligerent, recriminatory and gloomy speech by the new uribista President of the Senate, Ernesto Macías (and Duque’s bland speech), was an early indication that Duque’s administration would be divisive and controversial (and ignore those who voted against him). For fans of pathetic fallacy and premonitions, the weather was rainy, cloudy and extremely windy in 2018. This year, by contrast, it was an unusually sunny day in a city known for being cold, rainy and cloudy a lot of the time. In 2010, in his first inaugural address Juan Manuel Santos said that the “door of dialogue is not locked with a key”, foreshadowing the future peace process and giving the first indication of his future differences with his predecessor Álvaro Uribe.

VP Francia Márquez (source: Presidencia)

If Petro’s inauguration sets the tone for his future administration, the outlook is cautiously positive, but with a lot of room for future disappointment. The reiterated openness to dialogue with all sides and his stated willingness to listen is positive, if it can truly lower the temperature and reduce the polarization and divisiveness that has plagued Colombian politics for years now. His new idea of ‘total peace’ is ambitious and, if successful, could finally bring real lasting peace to a violent society, but is also risky and extremely difficult.

On the evening of August 7, speaking publicly to the new cabinet, Petro said that “we cannot fail”. He’s right: the crowd’s enthusiasm at his inauguration shows that Petro faces very high expectations and has little room for error.

The cabinet

By mid July, Petro had already appointed seven cabinet ministers (see my previous post here). After that, however, it took him an unusually long time to fill the rest of his cabinet: two days before his inauguration, 10 of the 18 spots remained vacant. Most remaining appointments were announced at the last minute, shortly prior to his inauguration (or even during). One ministry remains vacant, and another in limbo.

The Minister of the Interior is Alfonso Prada, a career politician who had been Petro’s campaign manager. Prada has been in politics since the 1980s and has been close to several politicians over time: the late Luis Carlos Galán, Andrés Pastrana, Enrique Peñalosa (Petro’s arch nemesis in Bogotá) and most recently Juan Manuel Santos. He served three terms as city councillor in Bogotá (1997–2006), one term in the House of Representatives for the Greens (2010–2014) and then coordinated Santos’ reelection campaign in 2014. Santos appointed him director of the SENA (the national vocational training service) and later secretary general of the presidency (2017–2018). The secretary general of the presidency is a key position in the presidential office, as the president’s right-hand man and personal political operator. The interior ministry is the most ‘political’ ministry, in charge of relations with Congress and politicians and steering the president’s legislative agenda. Petro wants Prada’s political connections and past experience to help him guide an ambitious legislative agenda through Congress.

The Minister of Defence is Iván Velásquez, a famous jurist and prosecutor who served six years as the head of the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) until its termination by the Guatemalan government in 2019. Velásquez’s background is in law, so his appointment to the defence ministry was a surprise. In his long and distinguished career in Colombia, Velásquez served as departmental inspector in Antioquia in the early 1990s (1991–1994), investigating human rights abuses and extrajudicial executions during one of the most violent periods in the region and later as regional director of prosecutors in Medellín (1997–1999). In Medellín, he investigated paramilitary massacres in Antioquia carried out with the complicity of the military while Uribe was governor of Antioquia. From 2000 to 2012, Velásquez was an auxiliary magistrate in the Supreme Court and, from 2006 to 2012, he coordinated a special unit which investigated parapolítica and helped convict some 50 members of Congress. Because of his work investigating parapolítica, he was heavily criticized by then-President Álvaro Uribe and he became the target of harassment and persecution by the government’s intelligence agency (the corrupt DAS). In 2007, Velásquez was the victim of a sordid plot to discredit him. In 2013, Velásquez was appointed head of the UN-backed CICIG, and spearheaded the body’s explosive corruption investigations in Guatemala which notably resulted in the downfall of President Otto Pérez Molina in 2015.

Unsurprisingly given his past history with Uribe, uribismo was very critical of his appointment, seeing it as a ‘hostile’ move. Senator Paloma Valencia said that the appointment of a “staunch enemy of the party and Álvaro Uribe” was a threat. In any case, Velásquez has his work cut out for him. The defence ministry is a very sensitive portfolio, particularly when large parts of the military leadership are clearly at odds with Petro.

The Minister of Justice is Néstor Osuna, a lawyer and former magistrate. Osuna and Petro have the same alma mater, the Externado University. Osuna served ten years as an alternate judge (conjuez) on the Constitutional Court (2005–2010), called upon in cases of ties, and later was elected magistrate of the Superior Council of the Judiciary (2014–2015), the governing and administrative body of the judicial branch. After his career in the judiciary, he returned to academia and was a constitutional law professor and academic director at the Externado University at the time of his appointment. Osuna is the fourth openly gay minister in Colombia. Osuna is close to former president and Liberal Party leader César Gaviria and Petro was given his CV by Gaviria, who had been negotiating ‘quotas’ for the party in the new administration since June. Osuna admitted to Blu Radio that he is close to the Liberal Party and that, if in political terms that means he’s a Liberal ‘quota’, he has no problems with that.

The Minister of Labour is Gloria Inés Ramírez, a former left-wing senator (2006–2014) and trade union leader. A veteran left-wing activist, she is a member of the Colombian Communist Party (PCC) and was a member of the Unión Patriótica (UP) in the 1980s. She was elected to the Senate for the Polo in 2006, and reelected in 2010. She was investigated by the Supreme Court for farcpolítica (alleged ties to the FARC) in 2008, but was cleared in 2009. Ramírez also served as president of Fecode, the largest teachers’ union, in the early 2000s and was a member of the executive committee of the Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (CUT), the largest trade union confederation in Colombia. Fecode and the CUT have traditionally been closely associated with left-wing parties. Because of its left-wing politics, Fecode is often criticized by uribismo, which alleges that Fecode teachers are politically ‘indoctrinating’ students. During the pandemic, the teachers’ union was also criticized for strongly opposing a return to full in-person learning. Ramírez is the first communist minister in Colombia, something which right-wingers have been quick to point out. In the past, she had also effusively praised Hugo Chávez, Evo Morales and Rafael Correa.

The Minister of Mines and Energy is Irene Vélez, an academic close to Vice President Francia Márquez. Vélez, who defines herself as an ‘activist researcher’, was a full time professor at the Universidad del Valle in Cali. She is a specialist of environmental and agrarian conflicts particularly interested by “processes of toxic dispossession, environmental racism and ethnic-racial discrimination in extractivist geographies”. She is the daughter of Hildebrando Vélez, an environmental activist who is one of Francia Márquez’s closest allies and advisers. Irene Vélez did some of her research in Márquez’s hometown, Suárez (Cauca), and the two co-authored an academic chapter. Márquez is to be appointed Minister of Equality, but she needs to wait for the law creating the new ministry to be passed, which can take up to a year. In the meantime, as La Silla Vacía reported, she sought to have Vélez appointed as science minister (backed by an online petition). Irene Vélez’s opposition to the extractivist economic model is very much in line with Petro and Francia Márquez’s views, but she certainly doesn’t have the traditional profile of past mines ministers and her positions will worry oil companies and big mining corporations.

The Minister of Commerce, Industry and Tourism will be Germán Umaña, an academic and economist. Umaña is the son of Eduardo Umaña Luna, an acclaimed lawyer and sociologist, and the brother of Eduardo Umaña Mendoza, a lawyer and human rights defender assassinated by paramilitaries in 1998. Germán Umaña has been an economics professor at the National University of Colombia, his alma mater, where he also was dean of the economics faculty and vice-rector. He also served as director of the Colombian-Venezuelan Chamber of Commerce and was a columnist in Portafolio, a business newspaper.

The Minister of Housing will be Catalina Velasco. Velasco, an economist, served in left-wing administrations in Bogotá: she was secretary of planning (2006–2007) under Luis Eduardo Garzón and housing secretary (2008–2009) under Samuel Moreno. During Petro’s administration, from 2012 to 2013, she was vice president of public services of the Empresa de Energía de Bogotá. Since 2014, she was a consultant in public policies and urban management. Velasco is close to Petro and her husband, Eduardo Noriega, was secretary general during Petro’s mayoral term (2012–2015). However, she is also said to be close to Liberal boss César Gaviria, through María Emma Mejía, a former cabinet minister and diplomat. However, not all Liberals see her as one of theirs. Petro allegedly promised the housing ministry to the Liberals, in exchange for them joining his governing coalition, and the party sent him several names for the job, notably former representative José Luis Correa (rejected by Petro because of his lack of experience).

The Minister of Transport will be Guillermo Reyes, a former vice minister of justice close to senator Carlos Andrés Trujillo, the leader of the Conservative Party and Petro’s new ally. Reyes is a lawyer close to the Conservative Party and former auxilary magistrate in the Constitutional Court in the 1990s, who served as magistrate and president of the National Electoral Council (CNE) (2002–2006) and vice minister of justice (2006–2010) during Álvaro Uribe’s second term (the interior and justice ministry at the time was controlled by the Conservatives). Reyes was Carlos Andrés Trujillo’s lawyer and legal adviser when Trujillo was mayor of Itagüí several years ago, but Reyes also got a contract with Petro’s administration in Bogotá. He comes with several old scandals. In 2015, Reyes was accused of plagiarizing the late esteemed jurist and magistrate Juan Jaramillo (not once, but twice). He was also accused of having overseen the looting of the old narcotics directorate by Conservative politicians while he was vice minister of justice.

Reyes’ political benefactor, Conservative senator Carlos Andrés Trujillo, has become Petro’s new ally and played a key role in aligning the Conservative caucus behind the new administration. In exchange, as La Silla Vacía reported, the Conservatives asked for the transportation ministry (Trujillo asked for Reyes specifically). It is not a glamorous or high-profile ministry, but it is responsible for several agencies which manage juicy infrastructure contracts. Petro accepted, even if he is otherwise very reluctant to appoint inexperienced people to his cabinet. Reyes is one of the few ministers who has no relevant experience or qualifications in the portfolio he now manages.

The Minister of Sports will be María Isabel Urrutia, Colombia’s first ever Olympic gold medallist (weightlifting, Sydney 2000) and former congresswoman (2002–2010). Urrutia was a professional athlete who competed in shot put, discus and later weightlifting, winning gold medals at the 1997 World Games and the 1990 and 1994 World Weightlifting Championships. At the Sydney 2000 Olympics, she won Colombia’s first ever Olympic gold medal, in 75 kg weightlifting. After retiring from competition, she was elected to the House of Representatives for the special Afro-Colombian constituency in 2002, re-elected in 2006 but defeated in 2010. Urrutia ran for mayor of Cali in 2011 for the Polo (finished third) and in 2015 for the MAIS (finished seventh).

The Minister of Science will be Arturo Luna, a biologist. Inexplicably, the science ministry remained vacant for a week after Petro’s inauguration, with Luna’s appointment only announced on August 14. Luna is a scientist with a doctorate in biomedical sciences from the University of Tennessee Health Science Center, specialized in microbiology, immunology and biochemistry. Luna had previously worked in the science ministry (and its predecessor, Colciencias), but La Silla Vacía found out that he is being sued by the science ministry’s human resources office for not meeting the professional experience requirement for his previous position in the ministry.

Petro has suspended the appointment of Mery Gutiérrez as MinTIC, leaving that portfolio in limbo.

Mery Gutiérrez is the owner of the Tercer Canal, a left-wing YouTube news channel whose director is her partner, Hollman Morris, an old petrista stalwart (who has now somewhat fallen out of favour). Gutiérrez’s appoinment was criticized by feminists because she had vociferously defended Morris in 2018 when he was accused of conjugal violence.

While Gutiérrez is a member of Colombia Humana, according to La Silla Vacía, her CV was sent by Partido de la U senator Antonio Correa — a controversial congressman who comes from the criminal/political group of Enilce López ‘La Gata’ and her son. The Partido de la U, which has also declared itself part of Petro’s new governing coalition, had also been seeking ‘political representation’ of its own within the cabinet, like the Liberals and Conservatives, although they hadn’t demanded any specific ministry.

Gutiérrez was (until July 25) the legal representative and majority shareholder of Programar Televisión, a TV production company which received public contracts. Daniel Coronell on W Radio revealed that she had committed to hand over 20% of the company to a senior civil servant at Coldeportes (the old sports institute). Moreover, Gutiérrez’s company was suing the state for 45,000 million pesos — more specifically, the defunct national television authority (ANTV) which is now part of… MinTIC. Because of this obvious conflict of interest and other legal problems, Petro decided to suspend her appointment. Meanwhile, the Partido de la U now seems to assume that the ministry is theirs, because they’ve already given Petro three names to replace her.

Petro’s cabinet is gender-balanced, as promised, with 8 men and 8 women (9 if MinTIC goes to a woman). However, the most prominent and powerful spots— interior, foreign affairs, finance, defence and justice — are all held by men. While there is some regional and ethno-cultural diversity, most ministers are from Bogotá or Medellín. The average age is high: 59.2. Most ministers are lawyers or economists, and many are graduates of traditional prestigious elite universities in Bogotá.

Petro wanted to appoint qualified individuals with experience in their field to cabinet, and he’s largely kept his word. Many ministers are qualified with experience in their field (Ocampo, Gaviria, Cecilia López, Corcho, Muhamad, Ariza, Urrutia). Ministers like Irene Vélez and Iván Velásquez who do not have direct experience in their new portfolio can still bring a new and worthwhile perspective. Vélez’s academic work studying extractivism and its impact on communities is an important perspective on energy and mining issues, while Velásquez’s legal background in human rights and anti-corruption investigations can help reform the armed forces.

In political terms, the cabinet is a mix of left-wing veterans and other left-wing sympathizers (Ramírez, Muhamad, Ariza etc.) and more recent allies of the president, from a more centrist or traditional background (Ocampo, Gaviria, Prada). In the end, Petro did give ‘quotas’ or ‘political representation’ to his new coalition partners, as they had demanded in exchange for their congressional support: the Liberals can count the justice ministry and potentially the housing ministry as ‘theirs’, the Conservatives clearly got the transportation ministry with Guillermo Reyes and the U now considers the (unfilled) ICT ministry as theirs too. The other appointments, however, do not seem to respond to political demands of other parties or allies.

Some ministers are more ‘moderate’ in their politics and vision (Ocampo and Gaviria most notably) while others may be more ‘radical’ (Vélez, potentially Corcho and Ramírez). The cabinet doesn’t send an obvious, coherent message of the new government’s general direction: clearly moderate and cautious on financial and economic issues, but perhaps more radical (left-wing) on energy, the environment, labour and healthcare. One of Petro’s challenge will be to reconciliate perhaps clashing political visions, priorities and demands around the table.

Non-cabinet appointments

In addition to his cabinet, Petro has also announced some appointments to non-cabinet positions including his own inner circle in the presidency, administrative departments and agencies and diplomatic appointments.

In the presidency, Petro is filling his inner circle with old and new allies. The head of the presidential office, the Administrative Department of the Presidency (Dapre), and secretary general of the presidency is former senator Mauricio Lizcano. Lizcano, a career politician from Caldas who served three terms in Congress from 2006 to 2018 (see my previous post here), is a latecomer to Petro’s entourage — he only endorsed him in May — but has become a surprisingly powerful member of the new president’s inner circle. He was one of the four lead coordinators of his transition team and will now be Petro’s right-hand man in the presidency. The secretary general of the presidency is often the president’s chief political operator, managing ‘the computer of the palace’ which keeps track of the positions given to different parties in the coalition. Lizcano’s political experience (he was president of the Senate in 2016–17) means he knows the inner workings of politics well.

Lizcano will also be in charge of reorganizing the presidential office. As an austerity and cost-saving measure, Petro wants to eliminate several ‘superfluous’ and redundant consejerías (presidential advisers) that have been created over the years.

Laura Sarabia, who worked for several years as a communications advisers to former senator Armando Benedetti (who managed Petro’s agenda during the campaign), will be chief of staff in the presidency. However, she won’t be as powerful as Duque’s chief of staff, María Paula Correa, and will instead be more of a private secretary — managing Petro’s agenda and taking notes during cabinet meetings.

The legal adviser to the presidency is Vladimir Fernández, a lawyer whom Petro has known since 2011. Fernández has been implicated in several scandals — since 2018, he’s been under investigation for his role in a corruption scandal in his native Neiva (Huila).

With Petro’s ambitious ‘total peace’, one of the most important jobs in the presidency will be the High Commissioner for Peace, Danilo Rueda. Rueda, a longtime human rights defender and peace activist, certainly knows the issue better than almost anyone. Rueda, a member of the Inter-Ecclesiastical Commission for Justice and Peace (a human rights NGO formed by different religious groups), has worked with victims, accompanying victims of forced displacement, but he has also worked as a mediator and interlocutor with armed groups. Rueda participated in the peace talks between the government and the ELN during Santos’ presidency, coordinating the victims’ organizations which participated in the talks. Through his work, Rueda has long been close to left-wing politicians, most notably Polo senator Iván Cepeda but also the more controversial Piedad Córdoba.

He is not without controversy. Because of his work in the field with the CIJP, Rueda holds the state, allied with paramilitary groups, responsible for the conflict, a vision very much at odds with more mainstream and conservative views on the origins and nature of the Colombian conflict.

Petro has started to fill the various government departments, agencies and institutions. Petro was unable to appoint Cesar Ferrari as director of the National Planning Department (DNP) because he is a naturalized rather than native-born citizen (and therefore cannot hold high office). Ferrari is a Peruvian-born economist and academic. The DNP is one of the most important technocratic departments in the administration, in charge of public policy and economic planning and putting together the government’s National Development Plan, the road map for the next four years, and the four-year investment budget.

The head of the DIAN, the revenue and customs agency (equivalent of the IRS), is Luis Carlos Reyes, a US-educated economist who was director of the Javeriana’s fiscal observatory at the time of his appointment. Reyes worked as an economist for the FCC in the US and later as an assistant professor of economics at the Javeriana university in Bogotá. He co-founded and led the university’s fiscal observatory, the top research centre for public spending and taxation in Colombia. Reyes’ first task, with finance minister Ocampo, is to lead the administration’s tax reform. Together with Ocampo and the future head of the DNP, Reyes completes the economics and finance team in the new administration. Both of them have strong academic and technocratic backgrounds with a neo-Keynesian economic vision and moderate social democratic politics, sending a clear message of moderation, relative cautiousness and expertise in the new government’s economic policy.

As head of the SENA (national vocational training service), Petro appointed Green politician and former justice minister Jorge Eduardo Londoño. Londoño served as governor of Boyacá (2004–2007), senator (2010–2014, 2018–2022) and minister of justice (2016–2017) during Santos’ second term. Londoño lost reelection to the Senate in March.

Petro has appointed two indigenous persons to lead two key agencies in the peace process, the victims’ unit (UARIV) and the land restitution unit (URT).

Patricia Tobón, an Emberá lawyer and human rights defender, is director of the victims’ unit. Tobón had just finished serving as a commissionner on the truth commission (since 2017), drafting the chapter of the final report about the impacts of the conflict on ethnic minorities. She had previously helped draft the ethnic chapter in the 2016 peace agreement with the FARC. She has firsthand knowledge of the humanitarian impacts of the conflict on ethnic minority groups. Giovanni Yule, a Nasa indigenous community leader from the Cauca, is the new director of the land restitution unit (URT). Yule was indigenous governor of his ancestral territory, a senior member of the Regional Indigenous Council of the Cauca (CRIC, the indigenous federation of the Cauca) and participated in the 2016 peace process with the FARC. He was also one of the main leaders of the 2021 protest movement, forming part of the national strike committee.

Petro also appointed another indigenous woman, Leonor Zalabata, to one of the top diplomatic positions: ambassador of Colombia to the United Nations in New York. Zalabata is an Arhuaco woman from the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta who has been an advocate for the rights of indigenous peoples in Colombia since the 1990s.

The ambassador to the OAS is Luis Ernesto Vargas, a former magistrate of the Constitutional Court (2009–2017) and commissioner of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (2017–2019).

One of the reasons why Colombia’s foreign policy has long been so weak and ineffective is because most ambassadors are unqualified political appointees who receive ambassadorships as consolation prizes, retirement sinecures or political rewards. Petro has promised to professionalize the diplomatic service, with a 50–50 split between political appointees and career diplomats. So far, in his first diplomatic appointments, that hasn’t been the case.

Previously announced (see here), Luis Gilberto Murillo, Sergio Fajardo’s running mate in the election, is the ambassador to the United States, the most important diplomatic position. Murillo is a politician (former environment minister and governor) but he has experience and connections in the United States, where he lived and worked for many years in exile (and had dual citizenship until he relinquished it to become ambassador). While Murillo has obvious qualifications and experience for the job, Petro’s other ambassadors do not.

Camilo Romero, the former Green senator and governor of Nariño who ran in the Pacto Histórico’s primary in March, will be ambassador to Argentina. Romero had been looking for a political appointment, and while he would probably have preferred a ministry, he doesn’t really have the necessary talent and experience. He’ll need to do with a quiet ambassadorship.

Besides the United States, one of the most important diplomatic appointments — particularly right now — is Venezuela. Diplomatic relations with Nicolás Maduro’s government in Venezuela had been broken since 2019, with Colombian and Venezuelan embassies and consulates closed (in some cases, abandoned). Petro wants to restore diplomatic relations with Maduro and reopen the border, and Maduro is eager as well. Both countries have already announced that they will exchange ambassadors with each other. Colombia’s first ambassador to Venezuela since 2018 will be former senator Armando Benedetti, an old traditional career politician who became one of Petro’s key allies in the election (he managed his daily agenda during the campaign). Benedetti is one of Petro’s confidantes, undoubtedly important in the difficult and touchy first steps of restoring ties with the neighbouring country. It is unclear what his other qualifications for the job are though. On Twitter, Benedetti thanked Petro for his trust and vowed that he’ll surprise him when “we reach 10 billion dollars in trade” with Venezuela.

León Fredy Muñoz will be ambassador to Nicaragua. Muñoz is a former petrista Green representative from Antioquia (2018–2022) who was unsuccessful in his attempt to ‘jump’ to the Senate earlier this year, placing fourteenth among Green senatorial candidates (the list won 13 seats). In 2018, Muñoz was arrested at the airport in Medellín carrying 160 grams of cocaine in his suitcase and remains under investigation for drug trafficking. It is very unclear what qualifications Muñoz has to be ambassador in Nicaragua, particularly given that Colombia has a territorial dispute with Nicaragua and that relations with Daniel Ortega’s regime have been strained and very tense (Ortega expelled Duque’s ambassador in February 2022 after calling Colombia a ‘narco-state’).

It is notable that Petro has been unusually slow to make appointments. The controversies or legal matters around some appointments (DNP, MinTIC, science ministry) suggest that they didn’t do deep background checks, and therefore ran into avoidable problems later on. This gives a general sense of disorganization and unprepardness at the top level.

The election of the Comptroller General

One of the first duties of the new Congress every four years is to elect the new Comptroller General. The election is being held on August 18. This year, the election of the new comptroller is turning out to be a whole telenovela.

Under the outgoing comptroller, the powerful and ambitious Carlos Felipe ‘Pipe’ Córdoba, the Contraloría has become even more powerful. A 2019 reform spearheaded by Córdoba expanded its powers (and, by extension, its payroll), giving it authority for exceptional preventive and concomitant fiscal control (instead of just post factum) and allowing it to fine or suspend civil servants and elected officials. With thousands of jobs, the Contraloría, like other (theoretically) independent control bodies, has become parts of a spoils system sought after by politicians and elites. Córdoba, a shrewd politician, is friends with most of the political class (that elected him in 2018, but that he’s supposed to watch) and has appointed a lot of their friends and allies to jobs in the Contraloría. The comptroller general usually tends to be on good terms with the president, and often was elected thanks to the president’s implicit nod.

Since the 2015 constitutional reform, implemented by law in 2018, the comptroller is elected by Congress (both houses) for a four-year term from a list of ten candidates selected in a public merit-based process, administered by a university. The selection process includes a knowledge exam and a weighted points-based evaluation of CVs (Congress decides on the weighting and scoring), after which the university sends a shortlist with 20 names. Congress forms a special commission which selects 10 finalists from the shortlist.

The last Congress, presided by Juan Diego Gómez (Conservative, Senate) and Jennifer Arias (CD, House), launched the public selection process unusually early, in February, while no one was watching, likely anticipating the results of the 2022 elections. The Industrial University of Santander (UIS) sent a shortlist with 20 names in early March. The special commission, formed by 16 members from each house, was dominated by the traditional parties and the right (Duque’s governing coalition).

In late April, the commission selected the 10 final candidates. Of the ten, six had recently worked in the Contraloría under Córdoba, one had been Duque’s national planning director and two had served as regional comptrollers (with political connections). The left and ‘alternative parties’ were unable to put any of their three preferred candidates on the final list. In short, the outgoing Congress rushed to tie down the finalists to their liking, leaving the new Congress to choose one. In 2018, it was the newly-elected Congress which had selected the ten finalists and elected the comptroller. It is unclear whether this rushed process is against the law but it does go against the spirit of the constitution and the law.

At the time, Luis Alberto Rodríguez, Iván Duque’s young (35) national planning director from 2019 to July 2021, appeared as the early favourite. He had the implicit support of the Duque administration (and is also close to Córdoba) and had been actively courting congressmen for months.

Fast forward to July, with Gustavo Petro as president-elect and with new majorities in Congress led by the left-wing Pacto Histórico. The left, in opposition, had belatedly complained about the unusually rushed process, which reeked of politicking. Now, it wanted to get rid of the list imposed by the outgoing Congress and start from scratch. Senator Gustavo Bolívar, one of the heavyweights in the Pacto, said that the list needed to scrapped in order to elect an honest comptroller (but denied that he wanted a comptroller close to the new government).

In late June, Blu Radio revealed the OCAD-Paz embezzlement scandal, implicating (directly or indirectly) three of the candidates. The OCAD-Paz is an investment fund, financed by royalties, for infrastructure projects in PDET municipalities (170 municipalities most severely affected by the armed conflict). Municipalities present funding proposals for approval to the OCAD-Paz, a body which includes the DNP, ministries and representatives of municipalities and departments with the ‘preventive’ oversight of the Contraloría. According to Blu Radio, mayor complained that, for a proposal to reach the table, they needed to have a political ‘godfather’ and pay bribes of up to 6–15%, including 1–2% for officials in the Contraloría. Projects were approved without meeting all the requirements. The government and control bodies (the ías — Fiscalía, Contraloría and Procuraduría) were allegedly aware of these complaints since spring 2021.

The OCAD-Paz scandal directly implicated two of the finalists (both of them former officials of the Contraloría) and indirectly hit Luis Alberto Rodríguez, as head of the DNP at the time (he appointed the technical secretary of the OCAD-Paz, who is accused of taking bribes).

Petrismo took advantage of the scandal to push for a new selection process. They got their opportunity. The list was struck down by courts in Medellín (on July 12) and Cundinamarca (July 14) for not meeting gender equity requirements (it only had two women) and because some candidates were ineligible or did not meet the requirements. The Medellín court order gave the secretariat general of the Senate 48 hours to fix the list. In a rush, the outgoing Congress, with four days left in its term, ‘fixed’ the list. The new list had gender parity and was more merit-based, and it dropped the three who had been implicated in the OCAD-Paz scandal (including Rodríguez). The new list, however, still wasn’t to the liking of some petristas, like Gustavo Bolívar.

With or without a new list, the new favourite seemed to be María Fernanda Rangel. Rangel is a lawyer who was head of the information, analysis and immediate reaction unit (DIARI) in the Contraloría under Córdoba. She had previously worked closely with Juan Fernando Cristo when he was president of the Senate (2013–2014) and later interior minister (2014–2018). Cristo was one of the leading members of the Centro Esperanza coalition who supported Petro in the runoff. She has relations with politicians and congressmen (from her time working as Cristo’s right-hand when he was interior minister, in the golden age of santista marmalade), and has been actively campaigning, even hiring a communications firm. In July, she even appeared have some backing from petristas, who looked at her as one of the ‘least worst’ options on the original list. Gustavo Bolívar claimed that his internal rival, the new president of the Senate Roy Barreras, was campaigning for Rangel. Barreras fired back, denying that he had a candidate.

The new Congress, presided by the Pacto’s Roy Barreras (Senate) and David Racero (House), decided to form a new special commission to select ten finalists (again). Barreras’ decision to form a new special commission was controversial. Many congressmen raised questions about the legality of this decision to ‘redo’ the list of finalists, particularly given that the second list (in July) had already been modified to comply with court orders (gender parity and merit). Several congressmen resigned from the special commission, the most prominent among them being centrist senator Humberto de la Calle, who is respected as one of the ‘wise men’ in the new Congress.

Critics and the media claimed that the Pacto wanted to redo the list (again) to put their preferred candidate, Julio César Cárdenas, on it. Cárdenas, a former vice-comptroller, already ran back in 2018 and had been supported by Petro and other opposition members at the time. However, including Cárdenas on a new list was difficult: he only got 75.7% on the knowledge exam.

Ultimately, the new special commission rejigged the list only modestly. Only one name changed: a woman included on the second list who had withdrawn herself was replaced by a man who had been included on the first list. Cárdenas did not make the list.

On August 3, Rangel received the support of the traditional parties — the Liberals, Conservatives, La U and Cambio Radical (CR). In a joint statement, the four parties said that Rangel had “all the moral and ethical qualities” and proper qualifications for the job.

However, petrismo started moving against her. Bolívar has said that she is a ‘puppet’ of ‘Pipe’ Córdoba and would guarantee four more years of impunity. He warned that if she is elected, the Pacto Histórico will have betrayed its voters and broken the promise of change. Left-wing Green senator Ariel Ávila, in a 15 minute video, criticized her and said that no ‘alternative’ congressman should vote for her. Ávila argued that she is the candidate of incumbent comptroller Córdoba and called her work in the Contraloría ineffective. He accused her of having a major conflict of interest, because her brother is a partner in the company which manages the Doña Juana landfill in Bogotá (Bogotá mayor Claudia López has said this company is ‘ripping off’ the city and is suing it). Ávila pointed out that she never issued alerts about the OCAD-Paz scandal in her capacity as head of the Contraloría’s early reaction unit, even though she developed high tech information systems to monitor the use of public resources.

With Cárdenas not making the third (and final) list, the media speculation about the Pacto (government) candidate now focused on Carlos Hernán Rodríguez. Cambio revealed that, days before his inauguration, Petro and interior minister Prada spent hours meeting with political parties (without Barreras) including the Liberals, Conservatives and the U (the three coalition partners).

The Pacto was taken aback by the four traditional parties’ early endorsement of Rangel, which was seen as a blow to the nascent governing coalition (and, personally, to Roy Barreras). The new government began lobbying for Carlos Hernán Rodríguez as a ‘consensual’ and ‘meritocratic’ candidate. Although on the surface Barreras and Racero’s controversial special commission didn’t change the list much, they changed the weighted score of each of the candidate taking into account their interviews with the commission… and Rodríguez ended up with the highest score, ostensibly making him the most qualified candidate on the sole basis of merit…

The Pacto Histórico officially announced their support for Rodríguez on August 16.

Carlos Hernán Rodríguez is the former Auditor General, a little-known position (elected by the Council of State) in charge of overseeing the comptroller. He is a lawyer from the Valle del Cauca, a departmental deputy in 2002 when the FARC kidnapped 12 deputies (11 of them were later killed in 2007). He was close to former senator Juan Carlos Martínez, convicted of parapolítica and investigated for drug trafficking, and supported the 2007 gubernatorial candidacy of Juan Carlos Abadía, a controversial politician who was removed from office in 2010 for ‘political participation’. Rodríguez was departmental comptroller of the Valle, and was generally well perceived for his work (and tough on Abadía). Rodríguez is also close to Petro’s interior minister Alfonso Prada, whose wife’s brother was among the 12 deputies kidnapped (and later killed) by the FARC in 2002. Rodríguez told congressmen he’d be an autonomous and independent comptroller and that he wouldn’t be in the pocket of either Congress or the government.

The government’s pressure paid off. The Conservatives reconsidered their support, with the party announcing on August 17 that the party had unanimously decided to endorse him, a decision anticipated the night before by the Conservative caucus in the House. The 16 victims’ representatives in the House switched their support to Rodríguez after initially backing Rangel .The Christian party MIRA has also endorsed Rodríguez.

Although the Liberals and the U reiterated their support for Rangel on August 10, both changed their minds on August 17. The Liberals and the U switched their support to Rodríguez, praising his ‘experience’… although the U’s official statement cryptically mentioned ‘political realities’ as one of the reasons they changed their mind. The Greens also announced their support for Rodríguez. The uribista CD has not officially announced its vote, but may also end up supporting Rodríguez… With the left, the Greens, the Liberals, Conservatives, the U and the victims’ seats, Rodríguez got the votes he needed to win, one day before the election.

Rangel is not giving up without a fight, although she is suddenly the clear underdog at risk of being abandoned by congressmen who want to ingratiate themselves with the likely winner. CR reiterated its support for Rangel and she claims substantial support among the Greens and centrists in both houses. W Radio said that 75 congressmen met on August 16 to confirm their support for Rangel, although one should never, ever, trust Colombian congressmen.

The election of the Comptroller General was a series of twists and turns, confusing plot lines and several betrayals, all worthy of a telenovela.

Other news

• Finance minister José Antonio Ocampo presented the new government’s ambitious tax reform on August 8. The government’s tax reform aims to raise 25 billion pesos in revenue in 2023 (US$ 6 million) and gradually up to 50 billion pesos by 2026. I’ll explain the tax reform in greater detail in a special post. The main elements include raising income taxes on the wealthiest 2.4% who earn over 10 million pesos monthly, eliminating most tax benefits for specific economic sectors, creating a tax on ‘extraordinary’ crude oil, coal and gold exports and creating ‘fat taxes’ (tax on sugary drinks and ultra-processed foods). The reform does not touch the VAT, the government’s main source of revenue which affects everyone. The government is selling it as a reform to reduce wealth inequality and support social spending to improve social justice. The government needs to get it through Congress as soon as possible. The finance ministry’s presentation is available here.
• On July 20, the new Congress took office. For the first year, the presidencies of both houses will be held by the Pacto Histórico: Roy Barreras in the Senate and, more surprisingly, David Racero in the House. The installation of the new Congress was tumultuous, as outgoing President Iván Duque’s self-congratulatory speech was often interrupted and booed by the left. You can find the certified results of the congressional elections here.
• As aforementioned, in the first steps towards re-establishing diplomatic relations, Colombia and Venezuela will exchange ambassadors. Armando Benedetti will be Colombia’s ambassador to Venezuela while Venezuela’s ambassador to Colombia will be Félix Plasencia, a career diplomat close to Maduro and former foreign minister (2021–2022). Venezuelan defence minister General Vladimir Padrino also said that Maduro had ordered him to reestablish military relations with Colombia, but Colombia is much cooler to this idea.
• A government delegation led by foreign minister Álvaro Leyva travelled to Havana to meet with representatives of the ELN guerrilla and the Cuban government, to explore the possibility of restarting peace negotiations with the ELN. In a statement, the government said that the ELN shared its ‘will for peace’ and announced that it would work to guarantee the conditions to allow for the resumption of peace talks with the ELN. Peace negotiations with the ELN began under the Santos administration in 2017, but were broken off by Duque in January 2019 after the ELN’s terrorist attack against the police academy. Relations with Cuba, the host to the last round of talks in 2018, had been strained because Duque insisted that Cuba extradite the ELN peace negotiators who were on the island (in breach of prior protocols between the Colombian government and the ELN).
• President Petro announced the new military leadership (Joint Chiefs of Staff) on August 12. The new general commander of the military forces is Gen. Helder Giraldo, who was inspector general of the army (the internal investigative and disciplinary branch) until last July, confirming that ‘zero corruption’ within military ranks will be one of Petro’s main priorities in his security policy. The commander of the army is Gen. Luis Mauricio Ospina, who was director of the war college (Escuela Superior de Guerra) and has a diploma in human rights and international humanitarian law. The new director of the national police is Gen. Henry Sanabria Cely, who spent much of his career in intelligence. He is close to former Vice President (2017–2018) Óscar Naranjo, who was director of the police from 2007 to 2012. He’s already been criticized on social media for old comments against homosexuality and abortion he made on Twitter in 2015. The chairman of the joint chiefs is Vice Adm. José Joaquín Amézquita, who has an organizational rather than operational naval background. The commander of the air force is Gen. Luis Carlos Córdoba Avendaño, former president of SATENA (the military-controlled state-owned airline serving remote regions). The commander of the navy is Vice Adm. Francisco Hernando Cubides. These appointments automatically led to the forced retirement of about 30 officers with more seniority than the new commanders, including 21 just in the police, because no one can have more seniority than the commander.
• The new military leadership appears to be well perceived by the military, where many officers (and retired officers, who talk politics openly) are skeptical about Petro. However, on August 16, Petro stood them up and cancelled (postponed) his attendance at the formal event for the promotion of the new military command, with only 45 minutes notice. The presidency claimed that he was held up in ‘urgent, private government meetings’. Petro has never been known for his punctuality, but maybe he should work on that now.
• On July 26, the new Senate finally ratified the Escazú agreement, with 74 votes in favour and 22 votes against. The Escazú agreement is a regional agreement signed in 2018 concerning the right to access environmental information, public participation in the environmental decision-making process and access to justice in environmental matters. The Duque administration signed the agreement in December 2019, a sop to public demands following the 2019 protests. However, the Senate never ratified it, in the face of opposition from the business lobby and the right (Duque’s own party and the Conservatives). In June 2021, a first attempt at ratification died. In the outgoing Congress in 2022, a second attempt at ratification lingered on and ended up going nowhere. However, in the new Congress, Petro’s new majorities allowed for its ratification (and its upcoming ratification in the lower house). The Liberals, the U and, crucially, the Conservatives all joined the left and centre-left in voting in favour. The Conservatives had previously been among those blocking the Escazú agreement, but they’ve had a ‘change of heart’ now that they’re in Petro’s coalition — all but one of the party’s senators voted in favour. The CD and CR voted against.

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