Colombian Politics Digest IV: Global ambitions, local problems
President Gustavo Petro has now been in office for two months.
In this edition: Petro’s UN debut, reopening the Venezuelan border, the opposition in the streets, Rodolfo Hernández out of the Senate, a scandal in Cali, a horse in Congress and a tax reform update.
Petro’s UN debut
President Gustavo Petro addressed the United Nations General Assembly in New York on September 20, marking his debut as a leader on the world stage.
Petro’s speech to the UN was his moment to lay out his international agenda for the next four years. Unsurprisingly, Petro set climate change (with a special focus on conservation of the Amazon rainforest) and global drug policy as the top priorities of his international agenda.
Petro’s 20 minute speech was extremely blunt, quite compelling and powerful. He declared that the war on drugs has failed and that the fight against climate change has failed.
He was extremely critical of the ‘Global North’, depicted as the victimizer of the ‘Global South’, and of modern capitalism. In Manichean rhetoric, he accused the powerful ‘Global North’ (and/or modern capitalism as a system) of being addicted to oil, money, cocaine and the hardest drugs and blaming the jungle and its inhabitants for this ‘plague’ that torments them. In one of the most striking lines of his speech, Petro said “the jungle is burning, gentlemen, while you wage war and play with it.” He accused the unnamed enemy of having no interest in Colombia except to “throw venom into its jungles, take its men to jail, throw its women into exclusion” and to “kill its jungle and extract coal and oil from its entrails.” Colombia and the Global South, Petro said, served to excuse the emptiness and loneliness of wealthy capitalist society and to hide the problems that they refuse to reform from them — a searing attack on the ‘war on drugs’ as it has been waged in Colombia, as well as the extractivist economic model. He continued by criticizing modern hyperconsumerist and ultracompetitive society, claiming that it only serves to hide a deep loneliness and solitude, a sad existence filled with noise and drugs.
A large part of Petro’s speech was devoted to the failure of the war on drugs and its devastating impacts on the environment and communities in Colombia. He repeatedly referred to glyphosate as venom and lamented the human toll of the war on drugs: one million Latin Americans killed, two million African-Americans incarcerated in North America (read: the US). On the other hand, Petro repeatedly described coca as a plant which absorbs carbon dioxide and the sacred plant of the Incas. He said that the culprit was not the plant, the men who cultivate it or the jungle — but rather hyperconsumerist society and the irrationality of world power. The “disease of loneliness is not cured with glyphosate on the jungles”, he said.
Domestically, the idea of ‘total peace’ has become one of Petro’s top priorities. He took that message to the global stage and linked it to climate change, saying that war has served as an excuse to not act against climate change and that wars have been invented in the name of oil and gas. He argued that the cause of the climate crisis is capital, the logic of consuming more and more to produce more and more so that a select few can earn even more. He starkly warned that the climate crisis will kill hundreds of millions and push even more migrants to the north in search of food and water. Near the end of his speech, Petro said that “war is a trap that the end times closer in the great orgy of irrationality” and that “there is no total peace without social, economic and environmental justice.”
Petro pleaded to end the ‘irrational’ war on drugs, by building a better, more supporting and more affectionate, society. There will be less drugs, Petro posited, if there is less profits and more love, and a rational exercise of power. Aspiring to be a regional leader, he made a call for Latin American regional unity to save the Amazon rainforest and to end all wars. Petro reiterated his proposal for a kind of debt swap or debt forgiveness, an ambitious idea he had mentioned in his inaugural address.
Petro’s first speech on the world stage will certainly be one of his most memorable. Petro has a very strong sense of history and wanted his speech and its message to be historic. In a sit-down interview with Noticias Caracol afterwards, he mentioned the importance of an ex-member of the M-19 addressing the whole world as president of Colombia.
In many ways, it marked some very significant changes in Colombian foreign policy.
Even though Petro mentioned the United States by name only once, his speech was filled with implicit criticisms of US foreign policy and digs at the US — mentioning African-American incarceration rates, private prisons and drug consumption. Colombia has traditionally been closely aligned with the United States since the respice polum doctrine in the 1920s, with few exceptions. Without abandoning close ties with the United States, Petro wants a more independent foreign policy with a stronger focus on Latin American regional unity. Petro has denied that his speech was anti-American, and in any case Petro’s relations with the Biden administration are quite good so far. US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken invited Petro to co-host the Global Food Security Summit. Petro was happy to tell Noticias Caracol that US Senator Pat Leahy (D-VT) approached him after his UN speech. For now, Petro has the benefit of having a more like-minded counterpart in Joe Biden (like Santos with Obama). It is unlikely that such cordial relations would be maintained if a Republican (Donald Trump) wins in 2024, given how so many Republicans are very critical of Petro (most notably Marco Rubio and Florida rep. María Elvira Salazar).
Petro is not the first Colombian president to criticize the war on drugs at the UN. In his last speech to the UN General Assembly in 2017, Juan Manuel Santos had said that the war was not being won and emphasized its high human cost in Colombia, while pushing for a new approach (not criminalizing addicts and treating drug use as a public health issue). However, Petro is certainly the first Colombian president to say that the war has failed and to call on the world to end it. Furthermore, by laying the blame quasi-exclusively on consumers in wealthy capitalist countries, Petro has abandoned the idea of ‘shared responsibility’ in drug policy, breaking with an idea followed by successive Colombian governments since the 1980s.
In contrast with Iván Duque, Petro did not mention Venezuela or Maduro (or human rights issues), continuing his more pragmatic foreign policy while Colombia seeks to restore relations with Maduro.
Petro was ambiguous on the war in Ukraine. At the end of his speech, he called on Ukraine and Russia to make peace. Earlier, he had alluded to the invasion of Ukraine, saying that “they had invaded Ukraine, but also Iraq, Libya and Syria” in the name of oil and gas. He did not explicitly condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, an ambiguous position that he had already taken during the campaign.
In Colombia, reactions to Petro’s UN debut largely split along political lines, as expected. Whereas his supporters praised it as one of the greatest speeches, the right/uribismo loudly denounced it. Many on the right were particularly critical of his supposed ‘apologism’ for cocaine — in his speech, Petro asked rhetorically whether cocaine was more poisonous to humans than coal and oil, a line which was mocked and attacked by conservative politicians and commentators in Colombia and elsewhere (like in Spain, on right-wing channel 7NN). Former president Andrés Pastrana, who loves excessive hyperbole, said Petro declared himself as a great defender of cocaine. Others on the right criticized Petro’s ideological and accusatory tone in his attacks on the ‘Global North’ and modern capitalism. Uribista senator Miguel Uribe said his speech was filled with resentment and hate, while Paloma Valencia said that Petro showed his desire to bring ‘class hatred’ to international relations and his simplistic thinking on global problems.
Outside of the right, however, many praised Petro’s comments about the failure of the war on drugs and on climate chage. Centrist politicians like Carlos Fernando Galán, senator Humberto de la Calle and former interior minister Juan Fernando Cristo praised Petro’s speech. Even centre-right opposition senator David Luna (CR) praised much of the contents of the speech (particularly on the drug war and the Amazon) while criticizing the form. Many experts had largely positive reactions to his speech.
There’s been a lot of debate about Petro’s ‘Global North’ versus ‘Global South’ narrative, with the former as the victimizers and the latter invariably as the victims. Sandra Borda, a foreign policy expert and polisci prof at Uniandes, said that this narrative risks to divide more than unite global opinion and questioned how effective it would be at actually building collective policies. Petro’s narrative may have been excessively black and white, ignoring the Global South’s share of responsibility on issues like drugs, climate change and environmental destruction (particularly when one of Colombia’s neighbours in the Amazon is Jair Bolsonaro’s Brazil — not for much longer, Petro hopes). However, as some have argued, it may have been the right tone to make a mark and say what needed to be said.
While in New York, Petro also met with Ursula von der Leyen, Jens Stoltenberg, António Guterres, John Kerry and Jonas Gahr Støre (Norwegian PM). A rather silly ‘controversy’ boiled up in Colombia over Petro showing up ‘late’ at a dinner offered by Joe Biden for world leaders in New York, and therefore missing him. Petro defended himself saying that there was no appointment with Biden and added that he “wasn’t among presidents who look for when Biden goes to the bathroom to cross paths with him” — a dig at Álvaro Uribe and Andrés Pastrana who claimed to have had a ‘conversation’ with Donald Trump at Mar-a-Lago in 2017, when in reality they just briefly ran into him and said hi in the hallway.
Petro made quite an impression at his UN debut. Clearly, Petro is a charismatic public speaker who can deliver compelling and powerful speeches. It remains to be seen how he will turn his words into actions, both domestically and on the world stage.
Step 1 of the Venezuelan border reopening
On September 26, the first step in the (very) gradual reopening of the Venezuelan border took place. It was a very symbolic moment, but still of rather limited importance in real terms.
For the moment, only freight transport and commercial flights have resumed (slowly). Not all border crossings are opened yet, freight trucks will only be able to cross during certain hours (10am to 6pm), the resumption of commercial flights will be slow and private vehicles are not yet able to cross. Nevertheless, it is an important first step after seven years of border closures: the 2,219-kilometre-long border has been essentially closed since August 2015, when Nicolás Maduro closed the border for the first time. The border situation worsened after diplomatic ties between the two countries were cut in 2019. Only since 2021 have pedestrians been allowed to cross the border again.
Great fanfare accompanied the formal reopening of the border on September 26 on the Simón Bolívar international bridge, the main border crossing in Norte de Santander (with San Antonio del Táchira in Táchira state). President Gustavo Petro surprisingly confirmed his attendance at the last minute on Monday morning, after his entourage had suggested that he would not attend. President Nicolás Maduro did not attend, avoiding (postponing?) a handshake with Petro that Maduro wants (and needs) but which would be politically very difficult for Petro.
On the Colombian side, Petro was accompanied by foreign minister Álvaro Leyva, the new ambassador to Venezuela Armando Benedetti, the governor of Norte de Santander, the mayor of Cúcuta and the two ministers who have taken point on this file: commerce and industry minister Germán Umaña and transport minister Guillermo Reyes. The Venezuelan delegation included Maduro’s industry and transport ministers (fairly low-profile figures) and the new ambassador to Colombia, but the most prominent figure was Freddy Bernal, the governor of Táchira, former head of the intelligence services (SEBIN) and ‘old guard’ chavista (sanctioned by the United States).
Petro, as usual, arrived late and the Colombian delegation walked halfway across the bridge and met with their Venezuelan counterparts. They posed for photographers with white roses in hand, and Petro shook hands with the Venezuelan transport minister. A Venezuelan truck crossed into Colombia, decorated for the occasion with the flag and balloons in national colours, followed a few minutes later by a Colombian truck crossing into Venezuela. There were no joint statements, and each delegation went their separate ways.
Petro’s speech celebrated what he called an “historic day” for the Americas and he spoke at length about his ambitions for greater commercial exchanges in South America, envisioning truckers being able to drive to Georgetown (Guyana), Brazil and down to Patagonia. Petro called the border closures “sectarian madness”, comparing it to putting locks to rooms inside one’s own house. He mentioned Venezuela’s intentions to rejoin the Andean Community (which they left in 2006 to join Mercosur). Petro dreams of a future where Colombia and Venezuela are closely interconnected: with Norte de Santander and Táchira as a ‘platform for industrialization’ that brings progress and a better quality of life, with the migratory flows ‘stabilized’ and with citizens being able to live and work on either side of the border with their rights respected and their foreign credentials recognized.
Before any of that can happen, however, the newly reopened border crossings need to replace the illegal trails and contraband routes controlled by the ELN, organized crime and gangs since 2015.
It will take time to fully reopen the border. The Tienditas bridge, a new, larger bridge (with 6 lanes and a pedestrian bridge) completed in 2016 but never opened because of the diplomatic conflict, will remain closed until structural evaluations are completed — which could take three months. The bridge connecting Arauca and Venezuela is also closed to freight trucks until the structure is reinforced. Reopening the border to private cars could take at least another two months.
Commercial flights will take time to resume. Initially, the state-owned Venezuelan airline Conviasa wanted to operate the first flight between Caracas and Bogotá. However, in 2020, the Trump administration added the airline and its entire fleet to the US Treasury’s OFAC sanctions list. Upon realizing that, the Colombian government announced that it would not authorize Conviasa to operate the route. Instead, the Colombian civil aviation authority (Aerocivil) authorized Turpial Airlines to operate the route until December (as charter flights). On the Colombian side, low-cost airline Wingo, was due to resume flights on October 4 (and operate up to four flights per week) — but later suspended ticket sales, saying that the Venezuelan government had requested that they temporarily suspend their flights, apparently to resolve problems between both governments about the airlines approved to operate flights.
At the end of his speech, Petro said that “what happens in the political development of Venezuela, before anything, must be determined by the people of Venezuela themselves”, as it is in Colombia. This is perhaps Petro’s clearest message to date on the thorny issue of democracy in Venezuela.
With an extremely anti-Maduro public in Colombia (only 4% have a favourable view of Maduro) and an opposition that will be sure to hammer him over any silence on democracy/human rights in Venezuela or any perceived concessions to the ‘dictator’, Petro needs to be extremely careful in how he handles relations with Maduro.
He should perhaps remind ambassador Armando Benedetti of this, who has seemingly fallen in love with chavismo since his arrival to Caracas: he’s tweeted how the Venezuelan opposition is ‘very funny’ and called Juan Guaidó a ‘nobody’, claimed that Venezuelan migration has been “stimulated by the Colombian government”, blamed poverty in Venezuela on the “barbaric sanctions” imposed by the US, claimed that many Venezuelan migrants are returning home and questioned whether that has even been a mass exodus of Venezuelans (the UNHCR says 6.8 million refugees and migrants have left Venezuela).
The border reopening was unquestionably the easiest step in what will be a long and complicated process. Activists in Colombia have criticized the government for focusing exclusively on the economic and commercial aspects of reopening, while ignoring the huge security and human aspects. Petro is well aware of this, and in his remarks he hoped that residents of the border regions will be the first to benefit from the reopening. Petro invited Venezuela to be a guarantor in the new peace process with the ELN, and Maduro quickly accepted. Although dealing closely with Maduro risks being unpopular at home, Venezuela’s participation in the peace talks is essential if they are to be successful. The ELN, with significant presence and territorial control in Venezuela and actively protected by elements of the regime, derives much of its income from illegal economies in Venezuela and is a ‘Colombo-Venezuelan’ rebel army according to InsightCrime.
Maduro wants to use the border reopening and normalization of relations to boost his regime’s political legitimacy and break his isolation on the world stage. The Venezuelan government celebrated the border reopening as a victory, with Bernal talking of Venezuela’s “resistance” to the “commercial blockade” imposed by the United States and American interference which had sought to “use” Colombia as an operational base for its “economic war”. Petro needs to make sure that he doesn’t get used by Maduro to further his own political interests — that’s why the handshake between Petro and Maduro likely won’t be for another while…
The opposition’s first show of strength
On September 26, the first protests against the new government were held in cities across Colombia. According to police numbers, about 60,000 people took to the streets. The protests were organized by conservative/right-wing activists, primarily through social media, and supported by uribismo.
The decent turnout surpassed the low expectations (of both the organizers and petristas) and proved to be the new opposition’s first real show of strength. Most of the different right-wing politicians competing for leadership of the opposition participated: CD senators Miguel Uribe Turbay and Paloma Valencia, former minor presidential candidates John Milton Rodríguez (Christian right) and Enrique Gómez (far-right). CD senator María Fernanda Cabal, leading voice of the radical right, tweeted pictures and videos of protests around the country in support, like this viral video of the huge crowd in Medellín:
In general, most commentators had low expectations — the Colombian right doesn’t really have the habit of protesting, unlike the left. Yet, significant crowds — not huge, but still big — showed up, even though the government has been in office for less than 100 days. The conservative stronghold of Medellín, where Petro won just 34% of the vote in the second round, saw the biggest protests, with an estimated 35,000 people. In Bogotá, the protest filled about 60% of the city’s main square, the Plaza de Bolívar — ‘filling’ the Plaza de Bolívar is the age-old test of any protest’s strength and turnout in Colombia.
The protests had no common message besides general opposition to the government. Many opposed the government’s tax reform, but also the future pension and healthcare reforms (neither of which have been officially announced or detailed) — in the latter case, egged on by right-wing Semana magazine’s controversial alarmist frontpage “Panic in Healthcare” which claims that health minister Carolina Corcho has become a “terror” for the sector whose future ‘reforms’ would put people’s lives at risk. In short, the protests were against the government and Petro in general and what they represent to right-wingers.
More extremist protesters promoted various conspiracy theories which have unfortunately become popular among right-wing extremists worldwide: anti-Semitic canards (Soros etc.), Agenda 2030, UN ‘world government’, COVID-19 conspiracies and Bill Gates stuff (namely, transgenic mosquitoes).
In Medellín and Cali, the protests also opposed the controversial left-leaning mayors, Daniel Quintero (Medellín) and Jorge Iván Ospina (Cali). In Cali, where a recent corruption scandal is putting the very unpopular Ospina on the hot seat (see below), protesters demanded his resignation.
The protests were largely peaceful, with only some isolated clashes between protesters and pro-government/petrista ‘counter-protesters’ in Bogotá and some other cities. In Medellín, protesters harassed a team of journalists from Telemedellín, the local public TV channel. In the aftermath, both sides spun the peaceful nature of demonstrations to their advantage: Miguel Uribe boasted that “demonstrating without destroying the city, attacking law enforcement or affecting businesses is possible!” (in reference to the violence and vandalism during the 2019 and 2021 mass protests), while supporters of the government contrasted this year’s protests with the police brutality against peaceful protesters in 2019–2021, celebrating that the government had guaranteed the opposition’s right to protest.
President Petro tweeted, with a picture of an unimpressive crowd in the Plaza de Bolívar, that the right to express oneself will “always be respected” but that the government retains the right to correct misinformation.
Before the protests, petristas depreciatively mocked the protest movement — saying that only the wealthy and some pensioners would show up to a protest on a Monday, predicting they’d be a flop. Some then mocked the slow start to the protests in Bogotá, as the main square took time to fill up. As it turned out that the crowds were bigger than expected, online petristas/anti-uribistas instead began to denounce misinformation and extremism in the protests. In some videos compiled by a popular anti-uribista Twitter account, protesters struggle to coherently explain why they’re protesting or what they oppose — a reflection of how the protesters might not know exactly what they’re angry about, except that they dislike the new government and its policy direction.
Perhaps the most viral and infamous incident that’s been widely denounced is that of a racist woman who called Vice President Francia Márquez a “monkey” and ranted that black people are uneducated criminals. The woman will be charged for acts of discrimination and aggravated harassment in November.
Incidentally, the very next day, Gustavo Petro had his second meeting (since the election) with former President Álvaro Uribe, the ‘spiritual leader’ of the opposition (as he distances himself from the day to day activities of the opposition). Uribe was accompanied by senator Miguel Uribe and representative Óscar Darío Pérez. The main topic of discussion was the tax reform and other reforms, and the CD shared their concerns and views on those topics. Uribe has been quite conciliatory and moderate in his attitude towards Petro, often emphasizing that the CD is a “constructive” opposition open to discussions with the government. During a press conference after the meeting, Uribe, who in the past had called Petro a neo-communist and castrochavista, said that Petro was a social democrat and that he didn’t want the government to be stigmatized as neo-communist.
The protests were not a failure, and were a welcome moment for the right, which is still trying to find its feet in opposition. The right showed that they’re still a potent force to be reckoned with and that anti-petrismo, even as the government is still in its honeymoon, remains widespread. This shouldn’t be too surprising, after all: Petro only won with 50.4% of the vote, and 10.6 million people voted for his opponent. This show of strength doesn’t necessarily spell immediate trouble for Petro, but it should be a reminder to him (and his supporters) that the opposition — in the streets, if not in Congress — is active.
Rodolfo Hernández leaves the Senate
Rodolfo Hernández’s brief stint in the Senate is already coming to an end. The runner-up in the presidential election has confirmed that he will resign his seat soon — a seat he’s held by virtue of his second place finish in the presidential election.
He’s likely resigning his seat in anticipation of a run for governor of Santander next fall — current officeholders who want to run locally next year must resign from office a year before the election, so late October at the latest. Rodolfo hasn’t made his intentions official yet, and his statement says he will ‘focus’ his work from his party, the Liga de Gobernantes Anticorrupción. But it’s an open secret that he intends to run locally in 2023.
As I’ve written before, Rodolfo is out of place in Congress and he has repeatedly made clear that he doesn’t care for legislatures or the job of legislator. He only took up the seat he was entitled to so that he could obtain legal party recognition for the Liga. To justify his resignation, in his statement he says that he has the talent of a manager and not a politician and that his background as a civil engineer has taught him that actions are more important than words. He said that his presence in the Senate was like having “Messi as a goalkeeper”. In his very brief stint as a senator, Rodolfo didn’t stand out much and contributed little.
Since the rodolfista phenomenon of the first round of the presidential election in May, the rodolfista bubble has burst and his momentum crashed. His image has taken a hit, and several of his erstwhile supporters have become disillusioned or disgruntled. Many of his supporters disliked his all-smiles picture with Gustavo Petro, just ten days after the runoff, and considered it as a betrayal. The rodolfista groups on social media, the backbone of his spectacular presidential campaign, have whittled away, neglected by Rodolfo (who has also largely stopped doing his Facebook Live videos). The ‘traditional’ right and uribismo, crushed in the first round, have become the most prominent faces of the opposition to Petro (helped out by the media inflating them), eclipsing Rodolfo.
Having secured legal recognition for the Liga, he’s promptly turn his party into a personal dictatorship/family business and alienated a lot his closest allies. The new party’s statutes declare him ‘president-founder’ for life (Álvaro Uribe has a similar title in the CD’s statutes), the party’s leadership committee includes him and four other people handpicked by him — namely his wife, his youngest son and two employees (his personal assistant and his trusted lawyer) and he has the last word on everything, including all candidacies in the 2023 local elections.
He has distanced himself from his running mate, Marelen Castillo (who holds a seat in the House now), and is hounding her to repay the “fucking” salary he had agreed to pay her during the campaign (the deal said that she would need to reimburse him only if they won). An audio recording released by Caracol Radio revealed a very heated discussion between the two about the money.
The Liga’s two representatives (Erika Tatiana Sánchez and Juan Manuel Cortés), elected in Santander, were not invited to the party. The Liga put out a statement ‘clarifying’ that it has only two members of Congress (Rodolfo and Marelen Castillo), making the very bizarre argument that the other representatives were elected for a ‘different’ movement (with the same name, logo and Rodolfo’s endorsement!) which no longer exists… Both Cortés and Sánchez have since publicly distanced themselves from Rodolfo, denouncing their exclusion from the party by Rodolfo’s family. Cortés has said that he feels “betrayed” by Rodolfo and even declared that Rodolfo won’t be governor.
A few months ago, Rodolfo was seen as virtually unbeatable if he ran for governor in 2023. Now, according to La Silla Vacía, that isn’t quite so sure anymore. Another former mayor of Bucaramanga, Fernando Vargas (2008–2011), a businessman and owner of the Universidad de Santander, is considering a gubernatorial run and is seen positively by most local politicians and even the Pacto Histórico.
Scandal in Cali
The mayor of Cali, Jorge Iván Ospina, finds himself at the centre of another scandal.
On September 20, a trade union denounced irregularities in an Emcali contract — the city’s public utilities and telecommunications company. The 215 billion pesos contract (US$47.6 million) included blatant cost overruns, most infamously a 55" LED TV for 42.9 million pesos ($9,500) and an ergonomic chair for 17.9 million pesos (nearly $4,000). Ospina cancelled the contract, the manager of Emcali was forced to resign and Emcali tried to justify the contract arguing that annexes with technical specifications explained the costs, but that wasn’t enough. Ospina tried to blame everything on Emcali, even though he presides and appoints the members of the board of Emcali. He really didn’t help his case when he told Blu Radio that he had received the union’s complaint about the contract but that he didn’t do anything about it because “I didn’t think something so corrupt could be true”…
The scandal has pushed Ospina even further down a spiral of unpopularity. The Procuraduría, Contraloría and Fiscalía have their eyes on the city and its public contracts. The Procuraduría has revealed that 57% of all contracts signed by the municipality since 2020 were single-bid contracts. Rumours claiming that public contracts are handled by Ospina’s brother, former senator Mauricio Ospina, and former governor Juan Carlos Abadía (removed from office, now accused of bribery in a judicial corruption case), have resurfaced (Ospina denies that his brother has any control over public contracts). Public outrage is massive, as evidenced by the anti-Petro protests of Sept. 26 taking on a more anti-Ospina flavour in Cali.
Politically, Ospina has managed the rare feat of uniting the left and right against him. Pacto senators Gustavo Bolívar and Alexander López (Polo senator from Valle who used to president of the Emcali workers’ union) and uribista representative Christian Garcés, who don’t agree on much, have all asked Ospina to resign.
Even within his own party, the Greens, several representatives, senators, councillors and departmental deputies have asked the party’s ethics committee to investigate Ospina. The letter was published by Valle representative Duvalier Sánchez, a rival of Ospina (although Sánchez, as gubernatorial candidate in 2019, begrudgingly supported Ospina’s mayoral candidacy out of party discipline).
Jorge Iván Ospina, who is currently serving his second non-consecutive term as mayor, is the son of former M-19 commander Iván Marino Ospina, killed in 1985. Ospina is a left-winger, close to Gustavo Petro for many years, but politically pragmatic and opportunistic. In 2019, Ospina was backed by a broad catch-all coalition which included petrismo, the Polo, the Greens, the Liberals and Dilian Francisca Toro’s Partido de la U. In power, he has been supported by a large coalition, put together with quotas for different parties and politicians in his cabinet (Toro’s cousin is secretary of health and Roy Barreras’ son is planning secretary).
Jorge Iván Ospina is no stranger to controversy. From his first term (2008–2011) he already has countless judicial, disciplinary and fiscal investigations — in 2021, he was formally charged by the Fiscalía for irregularities in a contract signed in 2008 — but despite these scandals and a mixed record, he had a teflon popularity throughout his term. As voters have become far more unforgiving towards political scandals, Ospina’s second term has been difficult. He is the most unpopular big city mayor in Colombia, with a 33% approval rating in the latest Invamer poll, from August 2022, which is actually a 15% improvement from February 2022, when his approval rating was just 18% (with 73% disapproving). His popularity went underwater in February 2021 and he’s never recovered.
During the pandemic, Ospina’s administration spent over $2 million on the 2020 Christmas lights and then spent $2.6 million to organize a virtual edition of the annual Cali fair in December 2020 (with cost overruns) — all this during a very difficult period for the city. The virtual fair ended up costing more than past in-person celebrations, notably by paying foreign artists up to $150,000 for pre-recorded videos. His popularity collapsed even further following his catastrophic response to the violent 2021 estallido social (protests) in Cali, criticized by both the right (for failing to maintain law and order, tolerating blockades and negotiating with protesters) and the left (for failing to rein in police brutality and asking the government for help). Ospina is also belligerent, arrogant, intolerant of criticism and he has repeatedly insulted those who have challenged him, including journalists (including telling a critic to “get over it, loser”). This video from La Pulla, from February 2021, offers a thorough critical overview of Ospina’s scandals and behaviour.
Because of Ospina’s unpopularity, Petro rejected his offers of support during the campaign.
With the Emcali scandal and local elections in just over a year, Ospina now finds himself stuck deep in a spiral of unpopularity. Former allies are distancing themselves from him, his once-solid coalition is falling apart and his political allies are shifting their attention towards their own strategies for the 2023 local elections (in which being close to Ospina will likely be liability).
Animals in Congress
Yes, this title refers to actual animals. On September 20, the president of the Senate, Roy Barreras (Pacto), announced that the Senate would be ‘pet-friendly’, allowing legislators to bring their pets to work. He announced this while introducing a dog he adopted during the pandemic, ‘Covid’ (weird name for a dog, but OK). The idea had been proposed by animal rights politicians like Green senator Andrea Padilla.
What could go wrong? Well…
On September 27, uribista CD senator Alirio Barrera rode his horse, ‘Pasaporte’, into Congress. Barrera and his horse were allowed to enter the grounds but not the chamber. Barrera is a llanero (Colombian cowboy), professional horse tamer and coleador from Casanare, Colombia’s oil and cattle country in the eastern plains (Llanos Orientales), where he served as governor (2016–2019) before being elected to the Senate in March, with over 100,000 votes. Barrera said it was a “symbolic act” to bring attention to the importance of horses and animals as a means of transport and means of work in rural regions and to show that there is another country outside the big cities. He also said it was a protest against bills which are seeking to ban the use of animals in certain activities and other controversial traditions like coleo, cavalcades, cockfighting and bullfighting.
Barrera said that it wasn’t his fault that he doesn’t have a cat or a dog. When some questioned whether his horse could be his pet, Barrera asserted that not only was ‘Pasaporte’ his pet but also his friend and work companion who lives with him. He assured that the horse travelled with all his documents and suitable comforts for him.
He said that his horse and less dangerous and less harmful than many of the politicians that have passed through Congress — and honestly, it’s hard to disagree with him!
Barrera’s little show divided public opinion. While he was applauded by his colleagues, right-leaning commentators and a lot of people from rural regions of Colombia like the Llanos (like El Cholo Valderrama, a joropo singer), he was criticized by a lot of other journalists and centrist/left-leaning politicians. Green senator Angélica Lozano called it ‘clownery’ and criticized the whole ‘pet-friendly Congress’ idea saying that it is unserious when there’s no childcare services for legislators and staff’s children. Liberal representative Juan Carlos Losada of Bogotá, known for his work on animal rights, said it was an absolute mockery of animal rights’ advocates and a “shameful pantomime.” Pacto senator Esmeralda Hernández also called it a mockery, and reminded that Barrera is against animal rights and supports cruel practices against animals.
Alirio Barrera’s publicity stunt worked wonders for him. The media, which prefers unserious news to serious political discussions, had a field day and gave him plenty of media coverage. He’s certainly increased his notoriety (even abroad!), becoming more famous now than he was during his presidential pre-candidacy for the CD in 2021.
The debate over Alirio Barrera’s horse also reveals a real political divide between progressives, who support animal rights and want to ban certain traditions (bullfighting, cockfighting) and practices, and conservatives/traditionalists, who argue that animals are part of daily lives (and a means of transport and work) and cultural traditions for many people in the countryside.
Tax reform update
The tax reform, two months later, is finally making its way through Congress.
The ponencia (rapporteurs’ report) in the third commissions was presented and quickly adopted in commissions on October 6. The revised text, the result of compromise between the finance ministry, congressmen and lobbies, proposes to raise 22 trillion pesos (rather than 25 trillion).
Compared to finance minister Ocampo’s initial proposal — which I covered in detail here — the ponencia would hit corporations harder than individuals and scraps some of the structural changes to Colombia’s broken tax system that Ocampo had proposed.
The export taxes on mineral resources, an issue of much debate, is replaced with a temporary surtax on extractive industries — at diminishing rates of 10% in 2023, 7.5% in 2024 and 5% in 2025. This would be charged on top of the 35% corporate tax rate. Moreover, a temporary 3% surtax on hydroelectric companies is also applied — Congress’ argument being that rainfall amounts and high energy prices have increased those companies’ profit margins.
The existing 3% surtax on financial institutions will not be made permanent, but it is increased to 5% until 2027. It will also apply to insurance companies and stock market commissions.
One of the main structural reforms in Ocampo’s proposal was to tax all separate sources of taxable income under a single, general schedule — currently, different types of incomes, like dividends and occasional capital gains/earnings, are taxed at different rates on separate tax schedules. Ocampo’s proposal would therefore have raised the top marginal rate on dividends and occasional income to 39%. Under the proposal, however, dividends and occasional capital gains/earnings will continue to be taxed on a separate schedule at lower rates: at most 20% for dividends, 15% for occasional earnings (like asset sales and inheritances) and 35% for raffles, prizes and lotteries.
Ocampo’s permanent wealth tax is retained and even toughened up with a temporary ‘super-wealth tax’ on the super-rich until 2026: people with liquid assets over 10 billion pesos (US$ 2.1 million) will pay a marginal rate of 1.5%.
On corporate taxation, one of Ocampo’s big structural changes was to eliminate most of the tax expenditures (non-taxable income, exempt income, preferential tax rates, deductions, tax credits, special regimes…) for different sectors and industries. These sectoral tax benefits are unfair and asymmetrical and the state misses out on plenty of tax revenues. But sectoral lobbies won the day, and a lot of these sectoral tax benefits are restored: for social housing construction, the film industry and hotel construction in smaller towns, among others. However, the preferential tax benefits for mega-investments and Duque’s ‘orange economy’ are scrapped.
The tax reform’s sugary drinks tax survives, but with some changes: only drinks with sugar content over 6 g will pay (used to be 4 g), and the top rate of 35 pesos per milliliters will only be charged on drinks with sugar content over 10 g (used to be 8 g). As La Silla Vacía found out, this will exempt one of the most popular soft drinks from the tax: Manzana Postobón (4.8 g per 100 ml), produced by the soft drinks giant Postobón (owned by the Ardila Lülle organization). Coca Cola, however, won’t be exempted. The fat tax on ultra-processed foods survives, at a rate of 10% of the product value, but neighbourhood shops (tiendas) and bakeries will not pay the tax.
Finally, the VAT-free days are abolished (as initially announced). After proposing to abolish the gimmicky ‘Black Friday’ tax holidays invented by Duquue, Ocampo gave in to business pressure and announced that two (instead of three) VAT-free days would be kept, but only on national products. It turns out that this would be contravening trade agreements with the WTO, so the ponencia confirms the abolition of the VAT-free days.
Other news
- Peace negotiations between the government and the ELN will officially resume in the first week of November. The guarantor countries will be Cuba, Norway and Venezuela. Peace talks had been cut since 2019 and de facto frozen since Iván Duque’s election in the summer of 2018. The ELN is much stronger militarily than it was when it last negotiated, with Santos in 2017–8. The peace process is following a rather different playbook than the one used by Santos in the successful peace process with the FARC in Havana.
- Inflation continued to increase, reaching 11.44% in September, the highest since 1999. A few days before, the central bank (Banrep) raised interest rates to 10% (from 9%), the ninth consecutive increase to reach the highest level since 2008. The decision was expected and supported by markets and the financial world. However, after the inflation numbers fell, Petro criticized the Banrep’s decision, saying that raising interest rates doesn’t contain inflation. Petro wants the central bank to concern itself with economic growth and unemployment rather just inflation, and the government is very concerned that high interest rates will significantly cool down the economy: Colombia’s post-pandemic bounceback remains strong in 2022 (GDP growth was 12.6% in Q2 and is projected to be 7% this year), but growth could be much slower (2–3%) in 2023. The mayor of Bogotá, Claudia López, also criticized the Banrep’s decision, calling it “respectable but very debatable” and considering that high interest rates will increase unemployment and poverty. Petro came under fire for criticizing the independent central bank, but he retorted that any citizen has the right to give his opinion. In the past, Petro has been critical of the Banrep, in part because, unusually, the five members of the board of directors were appointed by Duque.
- President Petro met with US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken in Bogotá on October 3.
- The presidency spent over 173 million pesos (US$38,300) on appliances and beddings for the private residences and guest houses. These purchases included an 85" TV for $6,000, a blender for $400, two induction cooktops for $7,700 and two goose duvets for $1,800. These expensive purchases contradict the government’s message of austerity. The government struggled to get its story straight on this issue. While Mauricio Lizcano, the administrative director of the presidency (Dapre), said these were routine purchases done by staff, Gustavo Petro later said that these purchases were done so that service staff could enjoy the same comforts as guests, after finding “absolute discrimination” in their food and accommodation. Unsurprisingly, the purchases generated controversy and scandal, and was even criticized by Pacto senators Gustavo Bolívar and María José Pizarro. They also evidence a rift between Petro and Lizcano, his right-hand man in the presidency and last-minute ally. This isn’t the first scandal about extravagant expenditures for the president — it happened with Duque and Santos too.
- First Lady Verónica Alcocer represented Colombia at the state funeral for Queen Elizabeth II in the UK and the state funeral for Shinzo Abe in Japan (and was in New York with her husband for the UNGA in between), having been designated as “ambassador on special mission”. The travel expenses of over 63 million pesos were covered by the foreign ministry. First ladies have no official title or role, but have often been designated as ambassadors on special mission (13 times for Duque’s wife, 10 times for Santos’ wife). Alcocer’s visits to the UK and Japan were criticized for the costs and for usurping the role of the foreign minister and ambassadors.
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