Colombian Politics Digest V: Six months
President Gustavo Petro has been office for six months. He celebrated his first 100 days in office in mid-November, and Congress ended its first session of its first legislative year on December 16, 2022.
Petro’s early honeymoon with public opinion has ended. He’s scored some early political victories and had a few policy successes, but he’s also had some difficulties, problems, controversies and made some mistakes. It’s time to take stock of what’s happened recently, particularly since my last post in early October.
In this edition: The 2022 tax reform, total peace and the ELN ceasefire kerfuffle, Primera Línea ‘pardon’, foreign policy successes and troubles
The tax reform
A new president’s first congressional session (August — December) is their best opportunity to pass the most ambitious and pressing items on their legislative agenda. Petro made relatively good use of his first congressional session, and most of his administration’s first legislative priorities were passed — though not without drama and some political difficulties.
The 2022 tax reform was the administration’s top priority. Finance minister José Antonio Ocampo presented it in August, and it was finally adopted by Congress on November 17. President Petro signed it into law on December 13 as Law 2277 of 2022.
The 2022 tax reform is the biggest tax reform in recent history, aiming to raise 20 trillion pesos (US$ 4.2 billion) or 1.3% of GDP in new revenues in 2023 to finance the new administration’s big spending projects. The original proposal was even more ambitious, with a goal of 25 trillion pesos. I explained Colombia’s broken tax system and the original proposal’s main points here.
In the final version, corporations and the wealthiest individuals will bear the brunt of the new taxes, in keeping with the government’s promises to make the tax system more progressive. In 2023, 77% of new revenues — just over 1% of GDP — will come from corporate taxation and new taxes on mineral subsoil resources.
The tax reform keeps the high 35% corporate income tax rate and introduces various new ‘temporary’ and permanent surtaxes on certain sectors: a temporary 5% surtax on financial institutions and insurance companies until 2027 (up from 3%) and a temporary 3% surtax on large hydroelectric companies until 2026. The House of Representatives, in plenary debate, had adopted a lower tax rate (30%) for SMEs — pushed by Dignidad rep. Jennifer Pedraza over the government’s opposition, but this provision was eliminated in conciliation.
The oil and coal industries will be the hardest hit by the tax reform: 57% of all new revenues to be raised in 2023 will come from new taxes on mineral subsoil resources (although this percentage will drop to 35% in 2024, 20% in 2025 and 14% in 2026). The tax reform creates permanent surtaxes on coal (at rates of 5 or 10%) and crude oil extraction (at rates of 5, 10 or 15%) based on average international market prices. In addition, mining and oil royalties will no longer be tax-deductible.
According to the finance ministry’s calculations, the effective tax rate for the oil and coal industries will increase to 34–47% for the oil industry and 43–57% for the coal industry. However, the liberal think-tank Fedesarollo, very critical of the new taxes, estimates that with these new taxes the effective tax rate for the mining-energy sector will increase from 36% to 65–70%, and could reduce oil production by 82,000 barrels/day in 2023–2030.
Unsurprisingly, the oil industry has been very critical of these new taxes. The Colombian oil and gas association (ACP) has said that the reform will suffocate the sector and reduce oil production, and further claimed that new revenues with the reform by 2026 would actually be 10% less than without the reform. On the other hand, the majority state-owned oil company, Ecopetrol, believes that the reform will only have a minor impact on its finances and Ecopetrol’s president, Felipe Bayón, has said that it is “absolutely reasonable” for the oil industry to pay more if oil prices are high and the industry is doing well.
The law also introduces a minimum corporate tax rate of 15%, an annual limit of 3% (of net income) for non-taxable income, exempt income and tax credits and, from 2024, the preferential 20% tax rate in free-trade zones (FTZs) will only be applied for export activities (the regular 35% rate will be applied on all other activities) and companies in FTZs will need to submit an internationalization plan. Non-resident foreign businesses with a significant economic presence in Colombia will also be taxed.
Ocampo’s initial proposal wanted to eliminate the quasi-entirety of the many ‘asymmetrical’ tax benefits which skew Colombia’s tax system and favour certain economic sectors over others (mega-investments, hotels, agro-industry, tourism etc.). In Congress, however, lobbyists and their allies managed to save a few preferential tax rates, like a 15% rate for 10 years for new hotels in smaller towns (up from 9% currently).
The tax reform makes some significant changes to the personal income tax system, but raises taxes only on those earning (gross) more than 13 million pesos monthly (~US$ 2,700), or about 610,000 tax filers. With the tax reform, all sources of taxable income except for occasional income (capital gains, inheritances etc.) will be added up and taxed at the general schedule, with marginal tax rates up to 39%, and the nominal limits on a 40% ceiling for exempt income and tax deductions and 25% labour income deduction are significantly lowered. However, a new 19% tax deduction for dividends means that the maximum marginal tax rate on dividends for individuals will be 20% (currently 10%). The tax rate on occasional income, including capital gains, will increase from 10% to 15%.
The reform recreates a permanent wealth tax (a ‘temporary’ wealth tax existed in some form or another from 2002 to 2022) on individuals with a net worth over 3 billion pesos (US$ 644,000), excluding the primary residence (up to 509 million pesos), at marginal tax rates of 0.5% and 1%. In addition, Congress also imposed a ‘temporary’ ‘super-wealth tax’ on the super-rich until 2026 at a marginal rate of 1.5% on assets exceeding 10 billion pesos (US$ 2.1 million).
However, wealthy pensioners still won’t pay taxes. In late October, Petro was forced to backtrack from the government’s initial proposal to tax pensioners receiving over 10 million pesos a month (only 16,700 or so people) and retain the current absurdly high pension income exemption. These ‘mega-pensions’ paid out to a lucky few (almost all in the public defined benefit system) are heavily subsidized by taxpayer at great cost to the national budget (3% of GDP). Pacto Histórico senator Gustavo Bolívar admitted that the article was “misconstrued, misrepresented and miscommunicated”. When Petro signed the bill into law in December, he said that he would have liked to see a tax on high pensions. By giving in to Congress, the government sacrificed a good opportunity to correct (very timidly) the regressiveness of Colombia’s pension system.
After years of unsuccessful efforts and battles against powerful lobbies and corporate interests, Colombia will finally have ‘health taxes’ — a fat tax and a sugary drinks tax, to take effect in November 2023. The sugary drinks tax will be charged based on the sugar content in grams per 100 milliliters, starting at a rate of 18 pesos (sugar content from 6 g to 10 g) and 35 pesos (sugar content over 10 g), increasing to 28 pesos and 55 pesos respectively from 2024 (from 2025 onwards, the tax will start on drinks with sugar contents over 5 g per 100 ml). As I previously noted, in the first debate, the sugar content from which taxes will be charged was raised from the initial proposal of 4 g, which has the effect of exempting one of Colombia’s popular soft drinks, Manzana Postobón (4.9 g of sugar per 100 ml) from the tax.
The fat tax (on ultra-processed foods and foods with high added sugar contents) will be charged at a rate of 10% on the sale price in 2023, gradually increasing to 20% in 2025. According to the finance ministry’s numbers, these health taxes will gradually raise up to 0.25% of GDP in new revenues by 2025 and 2026. Here too, the government tactically gave in and excluded some of the most popular food items from the tax: salchichón, mortadella, butifarra, arequipe/dulce de leche, bread, obleas and guava bocadillos.
These health taxes were perhaps one of the most unpopular aspects of the tax reform, as it is one of the few provisions in the law which will affect the majority of taxpayers. The right-wing opposition complained about how horrible it was that the government was messing with people’s favourite junk foods and sweet treats, like Chocoramo. More seriously, the new taxes will increase the price of these products (at a time of high inflation) and the immediate impact will be regressive, as it will it hit the poor and vulnerable harder.
The reform also creates a tax on single-use plastics and extends the carbon tax to include the sale, import, and mining of thermal coal from 2025, reaching the full rate in 2028. In addition, the law makes some changes to SIMPLE, a presumptive business tax system for microenterprises and small businesses aimed at incentivizing formalization by simplifying the compliance burden. There are several new measures to combat widespread tax evasion, including tougher criminal sanctions for tax evasion and tax fraud.
The reform makes very few significant changes to the VAT, the Colombian state’s biggest source of revenue (over 40% of central government tax revenue). Although experts have long recommended a number of changes to make the VAT system more efficient and expand its base, doing so has become political kryptonite and the government wisely preferred not to touch it. The reform does away with the gimmicky thrice-a-year VAT-free days created by Iván Duque in 2019.
Deloitte has a decent English technical summary of the tax reform’s main provisions (focused on corporate taxation), and there are detailed summaries in Spanish available here and here.
The adoption of the tax reform was a major political victory for the government, which was able to secure a big injection of revenues to finance its political agenda without needing to sacrifice too much. It was a hard-fought battle between the government and the governing coalition in Congress. The government made tactical concessions on certain issues — taxation of pensions and the health taxes for example — but held its ground on the high taxes for the mining-energy sector, which came to be of vital importance for the tax reform and the government’s own political agenda more broadly. The government did concede a small modification on how the tax would operate (becoming a surtax rather than an export tax) but did not give in to industry pressure on the non-deductibility of royalties. The ACP complained that these changes were actually 115% more expensive for the oil industry than the initial proposal. The higher taxes on the oil and coal industries are in line with the new administration’s anti-extractivist energy transition agenda.
In mid-October, former president César Gaviria, the leader of the Liberal Party (one of the most important elements in the governing coalition), put the reform in jeopardy. He said that he would not vote for it, saying that it was “extremely severe in these times of recession” and later adding that it had no article worth defending. Gaviria sought to push the government to significantly reduce its ambitions, suggesting that the reform should collect only 13 trillion pesos in new revenues rather than 20–22 trillion pesos. Gaviria shared eleven ‘comments’, criticizing most elements of the tax reform including tax increases on the wealthy, taxes on high pensions, the non-deductibility of royalties, the wealth tax, the surtax on the mining-energy sector, the stamp tax on the sale of real estate and the minimum effective tax rate for corporations. However, at a meeting of the Liberal caucuses, Gaviria was unable to get his congressmen to go along with him. Congressional Liberals reiterated their support for the tax reform as a whole, despite their preoccupations with certain aspects of it.
The government made concessions to other parties and interest groups as well. For example, the Conservatives managed to secure that 3% of the revenues from the surtax on financial institutions will go to finance rural roads, managed through the Ministry of Transportation (held by Conservative ‘quota’ Guillermo Reyes). Meanwhile, the governors managed to block an attempt to raise taxes on lottery winnings (lotteries are a major source of income for departments).
The tax reform as adopted is more or less in keeping with what Petro wanted: a (somewhat) ‘progressive’ tax reform to generate more revenues to increase public spending and improving the country’s fiscal sustainability. It is hardly a ‘radical left’ tax reform, although it does primarily hit corporations and has been criticized by most private sector business groups like the ANDI (national employers’ association). With the tax reform, the finance ministry estimates that Colombia’s central government tax collection will finally be slightly above the regional average, at 18.5% of GDP (compared to 15% in 2022).
All this being said, however, this tax reform is hardly a structural reform and looks a lot like previous ones — an attempt to find as many new sources of tax revenue as possible without it being too politically perilous, rinse and repeat in a few years. Given politicians’ aversion to touching the VAT or broadening the income tax base (what any truly structural tax reform in Colombia would need to do) the easy way out always ends up being more indirect taxes and corporate taxation changes (Colombia’s dependence on corporate taxes is the highest in the OECD).
As the Javeriana University’s fiscal observatory’s summary concluded, the reform’s objective was not to “build a more efficient, equitative and progressive tax system” and, as a result, over half of the anticipated new revenues come from a single sector. This, they argued, showed the Colombian state’s political inability to obtain tax revenues from various sources. They also observe the irony that the new revenues expected from the tax reform in 2023 roughly coincides with the 19 trillion pesos budgeted for 2023 to cover the deficit of the fuel price stabilization fund (FEPC), which subsidizes gas prices for consumers — without these subsidies, they say, there would have been no need for the tax reform (in the government’s defence, in September Petro took the politically difficult decision to reduce subsidies and increase gas prices).
In 2023, the government is expected to present a budgetary addendum for the 20 trillion pesos collected from the tax reform, which will specify how the government wants to spend its new revenues.
Total peace, total improvisation?
Petro has made ‘total peace’ — the idea of reaching final peace agreements with all remaining illegal armed groups in Colombia — one of the top policy priorities of his presidency thus far. He’s made tangible progress and had some successes — the adoption of a public order law to serve as the legal framework for ‘total peace’ and the reopening of peace negotiations with the ELN guerrilla. However, the government’s total peace policy seems to be totally improvised.
In November, Congress adopted a new public order law (Law 2272 of 2022), which extends for four years Law 418 of 1997. That law essentially grants the government special powers to enter into peace talks with armed groups and it has been used (and ‘renewed’) by all successive governments since then. This new law defines the Petro’s administration peace policy, built around the concepts of ‘human security’ (seguridad humana) and paz total, and now distinguishes between two types of armed groups: ‘illegal organized armed groups’ and ‘organized armed structures with high criminal impact’. The former are ‘traditional’ guerrillas, like the ELN, recognized as political belligerents with which the government may engage in a peace process to reach a peace agreement. The latter refers to criminal organizations and networks, including drug trafficking organizations and FARC dissidents. The new law now authorizes the government to enter into ‘conversations’ with these structures, in order to reach a judicial surrender agreement (sometimiento a la justicia) and their dismantlement — not a ‘political’ peace agreement.
The new public order law also makes other important changes to peace and security policies. The law now allows for ‘partial agreements’ with armed groups — a big shift from the Santos administration’s underlying principle of “nothing is agreed upon until everything is agreed upon”. It is unclear what these partial agreements are intended to be, but it is implied that they would include humanitarian deals or ceasefires. Some, like senator and former peace negotiator Humberto de la Calle, fear that this may perversely encourage armed groups to reach partial deals without going the entire way towards peace and disarmament. The law also allows the president to create ‘regions of peace’ where peace talks can be held. The intent behind these ‘regions’ is to decentralize peace talks and increase civil society’s participation in the peace process, particularly in regions most affected by the conflict. In December, the government announced the creation of six such regions (in reality six mega-regions encompassing several departments).
The law creates a social service for peace (servicio social para la paz) as an alternative to compulsory military service. This year-long social service alternative will include work with conflict victims, people with disability and vulnerable seniors or victims of natural disasters, as well as activities like alphabetization, agrarian reform, protection of nature and biodiversity, safeguarding cultural heritage and promoting peace and reconciliation. These articles were eliminated by the Senate in second debate, but included in the reconciliated final version of the law.
On November 21, peace negotiations with the ELN officially ‘resumed’ in Caracas (Venezuela), nearly four years after they were suspended in January 2019.
Shortly after Petro took office in August, a government delegation travelled to Havana to meet with ELN representatives and quickly announced that they would work to resume peace talks. In August, the government also suspended arrest warrants and extradition requests against ELN negotiators, which had been reactivated by Duque in 2019. The ELN reciprocated these acts of good will by releasing several hostages, including soldiers and police. In September, Petro invited Venezuela to be a guarantor in the peace process, and Nicolás Maduro quickly accepted the offer. In early October, Petro announced via Twitter that peace negotiations would resume in November in Caracas.
Both sides said that they’d pick up from where they left off and work from the agenda agreed upon in 2016 during the Santos administration’s peace talks with the ELN. This preexisting agenda has six points — public participation in peacebuilding, democracy for peace, transformations for peace, victims, end of the conflict and implementation. The design of the ‘resumed’ peace talks, however, is different. Unlike Santos, Petro has few ‘red lines’ in the negotiations: the only non-negotiable point is the 1991 Constitution (i.e. not constituent assembly). As the new public order law suggests, the government (unlike Santos) is also open to partial agreements and has said that anything that is agreed upon will be implemented immediately.
The government’s delegation is led by chief negotiator Otty Patiño, a founding member of the former M-19 guerrilla and member of the 1991 constituent assembly. Patiño has extensively studied and written about the conflict and the ELN. The ELN’s delegation is led by ‘Pablo Beltrán’ (continuing in a role he has held since 2016), the ‘political’ leader of the ELN and member of the Central Command (COCE). The ELN’s former leader, the septuagenarian ‘Gabino’, is an advisor to the ELN delegation.
The government’s delegation includes the high commissioner for peace Danilo Rueda, Pacto senators Iván Cepeda and María José Pizarro, a retired admiral, a retired army colonel and two ethnic minority voices (an indigenous woman and Afro-Colombian leader close to Vice President Francia Márquez), among others.
However, the most surprising name in the government’s delegation is José Félix Lafaurie, the president of Fedegán (the cattle ranchers’ federation) and husband of hard-right uribista senator María Fernanda Cabal. Lafaurie, long loathed by the left as a far-right extremist and bellicist opponent of peace, is certainly an unlikely name for the peace delegation of a left-wing government — but may be a valuable step towards ‘political peace’ and reducing polarization over peace. Lafaurie and Petro have become surprisingly cordial partners: in October, Lafaurie’s Fedegán agreed to sell 3 million hectares of land to the state for the ‘land fund’ created by the 2016 peace agreement. In November, at Fedegán’s annual congress, Lafaurie accepted Petro’s invitation to join the peace delegation. Lafaurie joined the peace delegation with the implicit blessing of Álvaro Uribe, who commented that Lafaurie’s participation “may contribute to reaching an acceptable level of national agreement on the issue.” Uribe also said that he was confident that Lafaurie would bring the voice of “many sectors, who for obvious reasons, remain skeptical on the possibilities of an agreement.”
Lafaurie’s participation in the peace process could be a very positive development for the peace process, but also comes with risks (for everyone). On the one hand, Petro appears cognizant enough of the importance of including all voices, including critical ones, in the peace process, to help reduce polarization. Lafaurie will bring the voice of the rural elites and others who are very skeptical (if not downright hostile) of the idea of peace with the ELN. However, as La Silla Vacía argued, Lafaurie will need to be very patient for what may likely be a very long peace process (with his actual role in the delegation unclear). If Lafaurie at any point gets up and slams the door, he may discredit it and badly hurt Petro.
The first cycle of negotiations with the ELN was held in Caracas from November 21 to December 12. A few days later, they agreed to invite Chile, Brazil and Mexico as ‘guarantor countries’ (Chile and Mexico have accepted) in addition to Cuba, Venezuela and Norway and Germany, Switzerland, Sweden and Spain as ‘accompanying countries’. The UN confirmed their support as a permanent accompanying party. At the conclusion of the first cycle, the two delegations celebrated the “respectful, transparent and cordial environment” and the success of the first round. The most substantive announcement out of it was a ‘partial agreement’ to address the violence and humanitarian crisis in Bajo Calima (Valle del Cauca) and Medio San Juan (Chocó) from January 2023.
However, just as the first cycle closed, a front of the ELN in the Chocó announced a paro armado (‘armed strike’) from December 15 in the San Juan River area in response to an armed incursion of the Clan del Golfo in the area. The front blamed the military for its alleged collusion with the neo-paramilitary group. The paro armado was lifted five days later, as the ELN announced a unilateral Christmas ceasefire from December 24 to January 2.
On New Year’s Eve, Petro announced a six-month bilateral ceasefire with the ELN and four other illegal armed groups including two FARC dissident groups (Iván Márquez’s Segunda Marquetalia and Iván Mordisco/Gentil Duarte’s Estado Mayor Central) and the Clan del Golfo (aka Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia). The decrees later issued by the government order the suspension of all offensive military and police operations against the groups and create monitoring and verification mechanisms with the participation of the government, the respective armed group, social organizations and the Catholic Church with an international component from the UN and OAS missions in Colombia.
It turns out, however, that, at least as far as the ELN was concerned, it was actually a unilateral, improvised Twitter decision by Petro. On January 3, the ELN said that the topic had never been discussed and that there was no agreement on a ceasefire, and, as such, it could not accept a unilateral decree from the government. As criticism rained down on Petro, the government’s chief negotiator Otty Patiño claimed that the ceasefire was a proposal discussed at the negotiating table but that no agreement had been reached. That didn’t stop the government from issuing a decree for the ceasefire with the ELN…
Even supporters of the peace process criticized the government for this fiasco. Senator Humberto de la Calle said in a video that it was “almost unbelievable” that the government hadn’t discussed the idea with the ELN and, if so, this was an “enormous mistake” by the government. He said that, when negotiating with a guerrilla, you cannot take it by surprise and the negotiating table is where discussions are held and agreed-upon decisions may only come from there. Green senator Ariel Ávila, a strong supporter of Petro’s total peace and one of the main ponentes (rapporteurs) of the public order law, said it was a “big political mistake” though there was no crisis in the negotiations. Ávila said that there are formalities and protocols to be followed in peace negotiations, emphasizing the importance of previously discussed, bilateral communications and decisions rather than tweets and unilateral government statements.
Cambio also claimed that the military was also taken by surprised, learning of the ceasefire through Petro’s tweet. Various active and retired officers interviewed by Cambio criticized the ceasefire as a political decision which benefits illegal groups and weakens the military. Defence minister Iván Velásquez denied these allegations, tweeting that he had met with military and police commanders on December 31 to provide them with the details.
On December 4, the government suspended the ceasefire with the ELN. The government’s statement explained that it had decreed the ceasefire with the elenos on the basis of the guerrilla’s previous declarations on the importance of working towards a bilateral ceasefire, most recently on December 19 when the ELN announced its unilateral year-end ceasefire. The interior minister called on the ELN to declare a truce while the terms for a bilateral ceasefire are discussed by both parties at the negotiating table. The government and its supporters attempted to save face by celebrating the ELN’s willingness to discuss the terms of a ceasefire. Iván Cepeda downplayed it, saying that mistakes and misunderstandings often happen in peace talks and they need to be calmly reviewed and corrected as necessary. Danilo Rueda, the high commissioner for peace, told El País that there was no crisis and that talks with the ELN were not at risk.
The ELN, however, didn’t take it as positively. The guerrilla said that the peace talks were in ‘crisis’ after Petro’s impulsive decision, decrying that the government’s unilateral impositions while still indicating their willingness to continue the peace process.
An extraordinary ‘pre-cycle’ meeting between both sides was held from January 17 to 21 in Caracas, before the second cycle of negotiations begins in Mexico on February 13. The special meeting seems to have resolved the crisis in the talks, helping to restore trust and mutual understanding while highlighting the importance of principles like bilateralism, trust and good faith. The joint statement said that the bilateral ceasefire will begin to be discussed during the second cycle.
The ceasefire with the other four groups is still alive. While it seems as if the government didn’t discuss the ceasefire with them any more than they did with the ELN, the other groups have accepted it. The government has said that, in the first 30 days of the ceasefire, there has been a reduction in criminal activity, including homicides. As the entire thing was rushed, there are still no clear rules to manage the details of the ceasefires — no procedures to define or verify presumed violations of the ceasefire, for example. Only on February 8 was the first protocol on the details of a ceasefire announced, with the ‘Estado Mayor Central’.
On the ground, the Clan del Golfo and the FARC dissidents have denounced violations by the state, while the government has avoided calling the kidnapping of three soldiers in Cauca by FARC dissidents as a violation of the ceasefire. The regional media in the Caribbean has talked about potential violations of the ceasefire by the Clan del Golfo in the region, and senator Iván Cepeda called out a threatening statement by the Clan del Golfo (aimed at local human rights groups) in Santander. In the first 20 days of January, the Defensoría (Ombudsman) documented six violent actions, the majority of them involving FARC dissidents.
While the ceasefire chugs along, Petro has clashed with Attorney General Francisco Barbosa over total peace. As it is authorized to do by the public order law, the government sought to suspend the arrest warrants against leaders of illegal armed groups to allow them to participate in peace talks or conversations. On January 8, the Fiscalía (attorney general’s office) ordered the suspension of arrest warrants against three members of the Estado Mayor Central (FARC dissidents), following Petro’s request. However, a few days later, Barbosa refused to suspend the arrest warrants against 16 leaders of the Clan del Golfo and Los Pachencas (the fourth group involved in the bilateral ceasefire). The Fiscalía argued that it could not suspend the arrest warrants because neither group has a ‘political status’ and that the law and jurisprudence only allows the suspension of arrest warrants for members of armed groups with ‘political status’ in peace negotiations. The government retorted that law 2272 allows the president to request the suspension of arrest warrants even for ‘organized armed structures’. At its root, the dispute is over contradictory and/or unclear laws and jurisprudence. There’s also a political aspect to it: Barbosa, a vain man, resents being left out from discussions on ‘total peace’, likely because Petro distrusts him (because Barbosa is a close university friend of Iván Duque who served in his administration).
To deescalate tensions, Petro and Barbosa met on January 30. Following the meeting, Barbosa said he would support the government’s total peace proposals but he remained adamant that he would not lift arrest warrants against members of armed criminal structures until Congress adopts a law to regulate the surrender to justice (sometimiento a la justicia) for these groups not recognized as political belligerents. Barbosa said that the Petro agreed not to enter into political negotiations with narco groups or seek the suspension of arrest warrants until the issue has been discussed in Congress. If so, this will delay conversations with groups like the Clan del Golfo until April-May at the very earliest.
The ELN ceasefire that wasn’t debacle and the dispute with the Fiscalía revealed that the government’s total peace policy seems to be totally improvised, without any roadmap or clearly defined agenda. The governments want to do everything with everyone at the same time, and it’s not clear who’s in charge and who’s aware of what’s going on. Danilo Rueda, the high commissionner for peace, is doing everything at once. Certain key actors — parts of the military and police leadership, the attorney general — are not being sufficiently involved in conversations before key decisions are announced. As for peace talks with armed groups, the government is improvising and learning as it goes along — it just found out the hard way that the ELN really doesn’t like unilateralism and decisions being made for them outside of the negotiating table. With other armed groups, the government has yet to give real details of what the sometimiento a la justicia will look like (besides trial balloons every now and then) and how conversations with those armed groups are supposed to go.
The government and its supporters are perhaps right that these are natural mistakes, misunderstandings and disagreements in a difficult process, and doesn’t necessarily spell doom, but it would still benefit from less improvisation and more structure.
Pardon for the Primera Línea: political prisoners or criminals?
One of the most controversial points of the new public order law is Petro’s version of gestores de paz (‘peace advocates’), used as backdoor method to secure the release of young protesters currently incarcerated and accused of various crimes (ranging in seriousness) during the 2019–2021 protests in Colombia.
Gestores de paz are nothing new — law 418 allows the government to release incarcerated members of illegal armed groups in order to allow them to participate in peace talks — and Álvaro Uribe invented the concept of gestores de paz by releasing imprisoned members of armed groups so that they could serve as mediators between the government and the guerrillas. In 2007, for example, Uribe — pressured by French president Nicolas Sarkozy — unilaterally released Rodrigo Granda, the ‘foreign minister’ of the FARC (who had been captured in an illegal operation in Venezuela in 2004) in an unsuccessful attempt to mediate the release of hostages including Ingrid Betancourt. Juan Manuel Santos and Iván Duque also appointed gestores de paz in peace talks with the FARC and ELN. For example ‘Juan Carlos Cuéllar’, a veteran member of the ELN, was designated as gestor de paz in peace processes with the ELN by both the Santos and Duque administrations in 2017 and 2021.
However, Petro wants to give a new meaning to the concept of gestores de paz by granting that status to young people currently incarcerated for offences committed during the 2019–2021 protests. The new public order law (Law 2272), in article 5, added a provision allowing the president to recognize as spokespersons (voceros) anyone who is currently incarcerated and “who act as members of social and humanitarian organizations whom the President considers can contribute to the peace process.” Previously, the status of spokesperson in a peace process was reserved to members of civil society who would participate on behalf of an illegal armed group with the express consent of that group.
In mid-October, the ponencia (rapporteurs’ report) for the plenary debate in both houses added two controversial new articles to the bill, including one which would allow the president to grant pardons to anyone convicted of crimes/offences during protests.
In the public’s imagination, this was seen as a ‘pardon to the Primera Línea’, referring to the ‘frontline’ youths who physically confronted law enforcement during protests through acts of civil disobedience, based on the group of the same name in the Chilean protests. It is a group made up of marginalized youth with bleak future perspectives, that oscillates between precarious jobs, studies, unemployment, vagrancy and, in some cases, delinquency.
As of November 2022, 155 members of the Primera Línea have been arrested and 171 have been charged with crimes including vandalism, damages to property, violence against public officials, obstruction of public roads, theft, arson as well as terrorism, kidnapping, murder and torture. Only nine, however, have actually been convicted, like ‘alias 19’, found guilty of torture and criminal conspiracy in November 2022. However, as this El País article reports, some have been imprisoned and accused without evidence.
Just like in Chile, the issue is highly sensitive and politically divisive. The left considers them to be heroes, unjustly detained as ‘political prisoners’ for exercising their right to protest and defending themselves against a violent and brutal police. Gustavo Bolívar has publicly supported them and helped raised funds to support their activities and to provide them with equipment (helmets, shields, gloves etc.) — and he’s recently said that he’s proud to have done so and would do it again.
The left understands that the 2019–2021 protest movement contributed to their historic victory, with the strong support of the young protesters and the release of the 200-odd imprisoned youth as a popular cause. In his victory speech in June 2022, Petro had asked the attorney general to “release the youth.” Petro appointed Gabriela Posso, a young (26) woman who participated in the 2019–2021 protests in Cali, as his presidential advisor for youth. On the day she took office, she wore a t-shirt reading “freedom for political and social prisoners” and invited the relatives of two young protesters killed by the riot police (ESMAD). Posso has said that the prisoners of the Primera Línea are “political prisoners” because many are falsely detained as “judicial false positives.”
The right considers them to be violent thugs, criminals and even terrorists who attack law enforcement and destroy property. For example, in 2021, right-wing Semana, based on intelligence documents, published a lengthy article presenting them as a “dangerous new criminal group”, funded by the ELN and FARC dissidents.
Each side, unsurprisingly, understands the protests and the violence differently. The left considers that those arrested were exercising their right to protest, and that their arrest is a result of the political criminalization of protest and the lack of guarantees for social protests. In some cases, they may justify protesters’ violence as a reaction to police abuse and brutality, or the consequence of years of invisible, ‘structural’ violence. The right says they support the right to ‘peaceful protest’ (but would like to see it regulated) but strongly oppose violence, civil disobedience and blockades during protests. They consider those who commit those acts and attack a ‘legitimate authority’, like the police, to be criminals, even ‘terrorists’ — and, therefore, balk at the idea of ‘negotiating’ with or pardoning them.
In general, the idea of a pardon for the Primera Línea is unpopular. GAD3’s poll for RCN Televisión in early November showed that 57% of respondents opposed this idea, with only 34% in favour.
Unsurprisingly, the two new articles in the bill were highly controversial. The right-wing opposition cried foul, denouncing the articles as micos (riders) and criticizing the government’s intentions to grant pardons to the ‘criminals of the Primera Línea’. Former right-wing presidential candidate Fico Gutiérrez tweeted that pardoning those who committed criminal acts during protests is to justify violence and that “all signs of the Petro government show that it is on the side of the criminals, of those who break the law.”
It wasn’t just the opposition, however, that was opposed. The traditional parties in the governing coalition — the Liberals, Conservatives and the Partido de la U — also opposed a ‘pardon to the Primera Línea’. The government was forced to withdraw its support from the two amendments, and on October 24, the Senate voted to eliminate them from the text (with 70 votes in favour). Representative Alirio Uribe (Polo) and other Pacto congressmen have instead presented a separate bill granting amnesties or pardons to protesters detained during the 2019–2021 protests for crimes against public safety and public officials.
The Primera Línea protested the elimination of these articles, violently clashing with law enforcement in Bogotá. Protesters threw rocks at the police director’s car. The police detained several protesters, until the vice minister of the interior Gustavo García controversially interceded with the police to release them.
The final text of the law adopted in conciliation did, however, include the provision allowing the president to appoint certain individuals currently in jail as gestores de paz. After the law was adopted, Petro promised that young people who had been arrested during protests in 2019–2021 would be released before Christmas, being appointed gestores de paz.
By using the concept of gestores de paz to release young protesters, Petro ironically runs the risk of reinforcing the idea — pushed by the right and authorities at the time — that these protesters acted in connivance with illegal groups like the ELN.
On December 9, the government issued a decree creating an “intersectoral commission (decree 2422) for the promotion of peace, reconciliation and civic participation”, made up of the interior, justice and defence ministers and the head of the administrative office of the presidency (Dapre). This commission is in charge of recommending the names of those who are to be released as voceros de paz, individually evaluating the cases of about 230 people. To fend off the perception that this is a pardon or amnesty by the backdoor, interior minister Alfonso Prada assured that this was not a pardon or amnesty, that the judicial cases would continue in the hands of judges and that each case would be evaluated with the utmost attention. Defence minister Iván Velásquez added that those accused of serious crimes like terrorism would not be released.
The first list of seven voceros de paz was announced by the government in mid-December. None of them have been convicted and are members of social organizations, “recognized for their social leadership and community work.”
The government’s plans, however, continued running into difficulties. Two of the seven were released on December 21 and could spend Christmas with their families, as Petro celebrated on Twitter. However, on December 28, a judge in Popayán refused to authorize the release of another two protesters, notably arguing that they had been arrested for a land invasion in 2022 rather than the protests.
On December 30, Petro announced another ten voceros de paz. A judge in Bucaramanga authorized the release of two of them on January 5. The statement noted that voceros de paz would need to attend all court dates and that their designations would be revoked if they committed any crimes or failed to comply with their legal obligations. The statement also offered some details on what exactly these voceros de paz would actually do: it said that they’d be part of projects led by government agencies like the victims’ unit, the disaster management unit (UNGRD), the interior and labour ministries.
The Attorney General, Francisco Barbosa, and the Inspector General, Margarita Cabello, have both been very critical of the government’s plans. The Procuraduría filed a complaint against the release of the first two, claiming that the official who authorized it did not have the power to do so.
In early December, Barbosa told Semana that the executive cannot influence the decisions of the judiciary regarding common crimes, and that the detainees are delinquents and not protesters. Cabello told Semana that it is up to judges to authorize the release of detainees. Both Barbosa and Cabello argue that while anyone can be appointed gestor/vocero de paz, this does not necessarily mean that they can get out of jail.
After the government issued decree 2422, Barbosa said that he didn’t understand the idea of gestores de paz and reiterated that the judiciary would have the final say on the release of any prisoners. Following a meeting with Petro, the attorney general said he was reassured that Primera Línea members accused of serious crimes would not be released but warned that he would remain vigilant if he saw something that went beyond the law.
Barbosa and Cabello, a former justice minister under Duque, may be seen as biased against the government. However, their concerns are shared by others as well. As covered by La Silla Vacía covered, the judicial branch is also very concerned about the government’s ‘intrusion’ into the administration of justice and this issue may add to judges and magistrates’ growing frustration and distrust of the executive — a risky move for Petro.
Rodrigo Uprimny, a legal scholar and director of Dejusticia, wrote that Petro’s idea of gestores/voceros de paz is “constitutionally problematic”. Uprimny noted that it is problematic to use the concept of gestores de paz, used in the past to release incarcerated guerrillas, to release Primera Línea youths — not only because the concept was created for another purpose but also because it may suggest that these young people are close to or members of illegal armed groups, an accusation brandished by the authorities and right-wingers during the protests but which they’ve always rejected. In addition, Uprimny argued that the provision in Law 2272 is very ambiguous and grants the presidents overly broad powers, in violation of the separation of powers. Senator Humberto de la Calle, for example, asked that the government present to Congress a specific bill to allow the designation of Primera Línea youth as gestores de paz.
Foreign policy successes and troubles
Undoubtedly, Petro’s most consequential foreign policy decision has been the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Venezuela. As covered in previous posts, diplomatic relations were restored with Nicolás Maduro’s government in August 2019, with an exchange of ambassadors, and the land border was (partially) reopened from September 26.
On November 1, Gustavo Petro had his first meeting with President Nicolás Maduro in Caracas. Petro was greeted with high military honours and welcomed to the Miraflores Palace by Maduro. It was the first meeting between a Colombian and Venezuelan president since August 2016
The meeting and the Petro-Maduro handshake symbolized the restoration of diplomatic relations after six years of diplomatic estrangement. The meeting was held behind closed doors and there was no room for questions from the media after the two presidents made their public statements. Both Petro and Maduro emphasized the close ties between Colombia and Venezuela, with Maduro speaking of a “common destiny” and Petro said that it was “unnatural and anti-historical” for Colombia and Venezuela to be separate (and said that separating both countries was a ‘suicidal adventure’).
The issues discussed included commercial integration between the two countries, the reactivation of intelligence cooperation to fight drug trafficking, climate change and the defence of the Amazon rainforest. Petro called on other members of the Andean Community (CAN) to accept Venezuela’s reintegration (Venezuela withdrew from the CAN in 2006) and asked that Venezuela rejoin the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, from which Maduro withdrew in 2013. Maduro said he was ‘receptive’ to this idea. Petro’s speech talked about democracy quite a bit, saying that Latin America was now a “beacon of global democracy” and called on Venezuela and other Latin American countries to join forces and carry the torch of democracy and freedom. For Colombian public opinion, where Maduro is extremely unpopular, it is very important that Petro is not seen as giving legitimacy to Maduro’s regime (which, in turn, is what Maduro is looking to get out of rebuilding ties with Colombia). The real test of whether Petro’s talk about democracy in Venezuela goes beyond words will be the 2024 elections in Venezuela (assuming they take place in acceptable conditions).
The Venezuelan border partially reopened in September 2022, with freight trucks authorized the cross the border at certain points. Commercial flights were due to resume at the same time, but that reopening has been even slower. So far, flights between Bogotá and Caracas remain very limited — only Venezuela’s Turpial Airlines operates regular commercial flights between the two cities. Colombian airlines like low-cost Wingo, LATAM Colombia and even state-owned SATENA wish to fly to Caracas, but those routes remain in limbo. In November, the first SATENA flight landed in Caracas to great fanfare from Petro’s ambassador to Venezuela, Armando Benedetti, but actual commercial flights have not followed since.
On January 1, another step towards the full reopening of the border was taken with the opening of the Atanasio Girardot international bridge (Tienditas bridge), including to passenger vehicles. The large Tienditas bridge was completed in 2016 but never opened because of tensions between the two countries (and blocked by Venezuelan containers since 2019).
On January 7, Petro made a surprise visit to Caracas to meet with Maduro again. Officially, they “reviewed the fundamental issues of the bilateral relationship” and a joint statement released after the meeting mentioned cross-border direct investments, trade, progress in the reopening of border crossings and infrastructure.
However, the Colombian media speculated that the real objective of Petro’s surprise visit was to ensure Venezuela’s support for the peace process with the ELN, just days after the ceasefire fiasco. Venezuela remains Colombia’s top strategic ally in the peace process with the ELN, and Petro may have asked for Maduro’s help in putting out the fire with the ELN. In the joint statement, Venezuela reiterated its support for ‘total peace’ and the bilateral ceasefire. It’s not sure if it had the intended impact, because two days later the ELN’s statement spoke of ‘crisis’ in the negotiations.
Petro has an ambitious foreign policy agenda, focused on the issues of climate change action and drug policy — on both issues, strongly criticizing the failures of global leadership. After his UN General Assembly debut in September, Petro attended the COP27 in Egypt in November and the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2023.
At the COP27, Petro’s speech was a ‘decalogue’ of Colombia’s proposals, described by experts as “full of general ideas, but with few concrete proposals.” His concrete proposals were an announcement that Colombia would spend $200 million annually over 20 years to save the Amazon and a reiteration of his proposal that the IMF launch a program to exchange foreign debt for investments in climate adaptation and mitigation.
In Davos for the WEF in January, Petro again focused on the climate crisis, proposing a ‘decarbonized capitalism’ to avoid the ‘extinction of the planet’. With his usual argument blaming capitalism for the climate crisis, Foreign Policy said that his speech in Davos “seemed more calibrated for a convention of leftists than bankers.”
On the regional stage, Petro wants to take on a regional leadership role and push for greater regional integration, particularly on issues like climate change and energy. The timing, for now, is auspicious with like-minded left-wing governments in Chile (Boric is probably Petro’s best ally), Argentina (although this may very well change this year), Bolivia, Mexico and now Brazil.
Lula’s victory in the 2022 Brazilian election was welcome news for Petro, particularly for Petro’s focus on the Amazon. After Lula’s victory, Petro tweeted that Lula told him on the phone that relations between Colombia and Brazil would be close because they both loved the Amazon. Attending Lula’s inauguration, Petro shared his wish for a “great pact to the save the Amazon rainforest” including Brazil as well as changes in drug policy and Brazil to be a guarantor country in the ELN peace process.
Petro was criticized domestically for his response to the Peruvian crisis after President Pedro Castillo was removed from office in December. Petro tweeted, in support of the deposed president, that Castillo was “cornered from day one” for being “a teacher from the Sierra and directly-elected president”, although he added that Castillo allowed himself to be led to “political and democratic suicide.” In another tweet, he said that Castillo had been wrong to use the article of the Peruvian constitution that allows for the dissolution of Congress, but that “anti-democracy cannot be fought with anti-democracy.” Petro requested that the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) issue an injunction in favour of Castillo, saying that his right to be elected and be judged by an independent court had been violated. A few days later, Petro added that Castillo’s removal had put into question the American Convention on Human Rights’ role in the Latin American legal system. Colombia joined Argentina, Bolivia and Mexico in signing a joint statement on December 14 condemning Castillo’s removal and arrest as a violation of the American Convention.
The right-wing opposition in Colombia, meanwhile, largely welcomed Castillo’s removal from office. Uribista politicians proclaimed it as a victory for democracy against socialism. CD senator Miguel Uribe Turbay tweeted that Castillo’s autogolpe “unmasked Petro and his allies” and concluded that “Congress must always be a guarantor of democracy and freedom.” This last sentence was interpreted by David Racero and Roy Barreras, the Pacto presidents of the lower and upper houses, as support for a congressional coup against Petro.
In Colombia, Petro’s support for Castillo has been read by some as support for a golpista president. Opposition politicians said that Petro should have forcefully condemned Castillo’s self-coup attempt. Petro’s position has caused a diplomatic crisis with the new Peruvian government, which has repeatedly criticized Colombia and Mexico’s ‘interference’ in their domestic politics and their continued support for Castillo.
During the campaign, Petro promised to appoint more career diplomats in foreign missions. In office, however, Petro has largely continued the tradition of appointing largely unqualified friends and political allies as ambassadors and consuls. He has appointed friends and political allies in important postings: former presidential candidate Camilo Romero (Argentina), former senator Armando Benedetti (Venezuela), former Green representative León Fredy Múñoz (Nicaragua), former interior minister Guillermo Rivera (Brazil), former senator Temístocles Ortega (Chile), former Conservative senator Juan Manuel Corzo (Paraguay), former Polo representative Germán Navas (Sweden), Jorge Enrique Rojas (Belgium, EU and NATO), Eduardo Ávila Navarrete (Spain), first lady Verónica Alcocer’s old friend Ligia Margarita Quessep (Italy) and Roy Barreras’ son Roy Alejandro Barreras (representative to the IDB).
In January, the announcement of Víctor de Currea-Lugo as ambassador to the UAE caused another firestorm. While de Currea-Lugo may have been more qualified for the job than some of Petro’s other diplomatic picks (he is an expert on Middle East politics), he also faces multiple accusations of sexual harassment going back nearly a decade from his years in academia. He was ultimately forced to decline his appointment, but it added to a long history of tensions between feminists and Petro, who claims to be a feminist ally but who has repeatedly stood by men accused of sexual assault or sexual harassment (when they’re his political allies).
In guise of a summary…
Over his first six months in office, Petro has lived up to the promise of ‘change’ that he was elected on. For better or for worse, Petro has proposed (and, in some cases, already implemented) major changes and paradigm shifts in nearly all major policy areas: economic policy, the role of the state in the economy, healthcare, pensions, welfare, poverty, land reform, energy, foreign policy, peace talks, security and drugs, among others. As explained above, he’s had a few successes — the resumption of peace talks with the ELN, a surprising deal with Fedegán to buy 3 million hectares of land and reestablishing diplomatic relations with Venezuela — and scored some legislative victories — the adoption of the tax reform, the new public order law, the long-delayed ratification of the Escazú agreement and the creation of the Ministry of Equality for Vice President Francia Márquez.
Rhetorically and symbolically, Petro has also been rather different from predecessors. He has repeatedly made clear that his priority are lower-income groups, communities and marginalized groups and that he wants to govern ‘from below’ with them. While he has allayed fears that he would govern as a castro-chavista (i.e. expropriations, persecution of political enemies, ‘confiscatory’ economic policies) and proven more ‘responsible’ in some cases, Petro has also shown his hostility to big corporations and businessmen — often saying what he really thinks about them to their faces (comparing the mining industry to cocaine). The employers’ federation, sectoral lobbies and other industrial associations have not enjoyed the privileged access to ministries and government officials that they had under most past administrations.
The one area where Petro hasn’t offered much change is in nitty-gritty politics. He’s welcomed traditional (opportunistic) politicians to the Pacto, like Roy Barreras (a seasoned political operator), he quickly put together a very large coalition including traditional parties (Liberals, Conservatives and La U), gave out bureaucratic ‘quotas’ in cabinet and other government positions to coalition partners, intervened in the election of the comptroller (to ensure the election of a friendly candidate), appointed unqualified friends and allies as ambassadors and the government has been willing to engage in backdoor political transactions, negotiations and some degree of blackmailing to meet its objectives. These were all typical Colombian political practices that Petro and his allies had criticized while in opposition. The anti-corruption rhetoric which was was pretty important in the campaign has largely disappeared.
While the government has undeniably had its share of victories and successes, it’s also committed a number of avoidable mistakes and created several controversies (amplified by the right-wing media and the opposition).
Perhaps the biggest long-term problem that is already apparent is that the government seems to be settling in a familiar Petro pattern of putting the cart before the horse, improvisation as a governing strategy and excessive focus on rhetoric and symbolism rather than implementation.
The ELN ceasefire debacle is the biggest example of this, revealing how the government improvised on such a sensitive issue. But there are other examples: the government has sent up trial balloons on many highly-anticipated and controversial future reforms causing confusion, total peace lacks a roadmap and improvisation is the strategy, energy transition and climate change gets talked up a lot but the actual implementation is a confusing and contradictory hot mess, just to name the biggest examples.
This is classic Petro: big ideas, good intentions (at least from a left-wing perspective), inspirational rhetoric but poor implementation, because little attention is paid to problems and contingencies. When he was mayor of Bogotá, he had shown this during the trash collection crisis (that cost him his job, temporarily).
His time as mayor was also characterized by heavy turnover in his administration and some officials quitting because of public disagreements with Petro. That hasn’t happened yet at the highest levels — although two vice-ministers (at energy and labour) have resigned with fracas — but there are growing publicly exposed divisions within cabinet on key policy issues. The divisions within the administration give a strong impression that different ministries and agencies are not on the same page and working in disarticulated fashion.
Critics have long considered Petro to be an arrogant, narcissistic and pretentious man, in love with the sound of his own voice. In any case, he is self-confident and quite fearless. While he listens, he is not particularly permeable and not very tolerant of criticism. As president, he has continued using Twitter regularly, and has only become more active in recent weeks. His use of Twitter has recently raised concerns in the media. His tweets have sometimes caused confusion as to whether he was announcing government policy or sharing his own political opinion — most famously in October 2022, when he criticized the central bank’s decision to raise interest rates and instead mused about capital controls, which had an impact on the peso’s value against the dollar. He has also used Twitter to criticize or get into online arguments with opposition politicians and journalists, and in February the press freedom NGO FLIP shared concerns about Petro’s use of Twitter and its risks for freedom of the press (in response, Petro retweeted comments critical of the FLIP).
Outside of Twitter, Petro has also gotten into unnecessary fights. Most recently, he got into a feud with the mayor of Bogotá, Claudia López, over his long obsession for an underground subway in Bogotá (instead of the above-ground metro that is now under construction, after the contract was awarded in 2019 by Petro’s local arch-nemesis, former mayor Enrique Peñalosa). After an escalation of tensions between the president and the mayor over Petro’s insistence on having an underground segment of the metro (which would raise total costs), transport minister Guillermo Reyes threatened to defund other mass transit projects in Bogotá if she didn’t accept the government’s demands on the metro. Even if many may agree with Petro that an underground subway would have been preferable to Peñalosa’s above-ground metro, most are just impatient to see the Bogotá metro finally become a reality — it’s been a topic of discussion since the 1940s!
Petro’s honeymoon is clearly over. A Datexco Pulso País poll in late January showed him clearly in the red, with a 51–39 disapproval spread. 2023 will be a tough year: not only does the government want to push through several major (and controversial) reforms in the first half of the year, it is also an election year. Let’s see how the government is able to navigate these waters…
Next: An overview of the government’s legislative priorities in 2023
